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SHOULD RACIALLY BIASED HATE
SPEECH BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY
THAN OTHER FORMS OF SPEECH?
Alessandra Hermetz
In popular memory and most published accounts, The
First Amendment of the US Constitution promises that, among
other things, “Congress shall make no law… abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”1 At face value, the meaning of the First Amendment appears self-evident: the US Government cannot pass any law that in any way restricts what
people can say or publish in the United States. But this interpretation, and support for complete freedom of speech, becomes more difficult when one considers the wide variety of
shocking, offensive, cruel and appalling things people can
come up with to say to and about each other. Interestingly,
early in United States history the First Amendment was not
seen by the government as the binding agreement to refrain
from restricting all speech that it is viewed as today; in fact,
within just a few years of the First Amendment becoming part
of the Constitution, there were successful (albeit, unpopular
and quickly overturned) attempts to criminalize certain unfavorable speech directed at the government. Anthony Lewis
1

Note: For the purposes of this essay, speech includes both direct
and symbolic speech–so, not only spoken and written words, but
also actions taken in order to communicate a message. This follows
the meaning of the word as it is used by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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notes that, although this early speech law never went to the
Supreme Court, “if it had been, the Court would almost certainly have upheld the law.”2 Today, the interpretation of the
First Amendment accepted by the United States Supreme
Court has shifted closer to the face-value reading of the First
Amendment, and both state governments and the federal government are held to high standards of speech protection. Currently, restrictions on speech must pass strict scrutiny tests,
meaning that those defending the law must demonstrate both
that the speech issue could not be handled some other way and
that the problem is pressing enough to warrant legal restriction.3 This is a test that is extremely difficult to pass, and
most restrictions targeted at speech fail to pass this test, resulting in a legal culture in which legislators rarely attempt to
make restrictions on speech and in which people are free to
say more or less whatever they want to (and any brief survey
of social media will reveal that many are quite happy to take
full advantage of this freedom).
In this paper, I will discuss two Supreme Court cases
concerning legislation with which state and local governments
attempted, and ultimately failed, to punish a specific category
of speech: racially biased hate speech. My goal is to demonstrate that, although current United States Supreme Court doctrine holds that laws specifically targeting racially biased hate
speech are unconstitutional, the nature of racially biased hate
speech is such that it should be a legitimate exception to the
rule that law cannot proscribe the expression of certain ideas.
In the first section of this paper, I will overview the
court cases, providing the arguments the Court gave for each
2

Anthony Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate (New
York: Basic Books, 2007), 11, 15.
3
John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43: 456–458, https://advance-lexiscom.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1f10-416a-bf139586bf0beb9e/?context=1516831.
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decision. In the second section, I will compare these arguments to the classic argument in favor of free speech presented
by John Stuart Mill. In the third section, I will present arguments in favor of hate speech regulation from critical race theorists. In the fourth section, I will present responses to these
critical race theorists from modern scholars who oppose hate
speech regulation. And in the final section, I will present my
own critique of the Supreme Court’s decisions and counterarguments to the arguments presented by Mill and those opponents of hate speech regulation discussed in the third section.
I will also attempt to present a version of hate speech law that
would allow hate speech to be legally recognized as unacceptable, while avoiding some of the consequences that those
opposed to hate speech regulation fear.
Supreme Court Cases
The United States Supreme Court cases I will focus
on are R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Virginia v. Black (referred
to throughout the rest of this paper as R.A.V. and Virginia, respectively). The first case, R.A.V., concerns a teenager who
was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance for burning a cross in a black family’s front yard.4 The
United States Supreme Court found that the St. Paul ordinance
was “facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses.”5 That is to say, the law was unconstitutional because it proscribed speech based on its content—it specifically
targeted speech that “arouses anger... on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion, or gender” as legally unacceptable, but
left speech that arouses anger on other bases protected. The
court explained that, while the ordinance only applied to bi4
5

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
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ased speech that constituted “fighting words,” which the Supreme Court has recognized as proscribable, it was unconstitutional because it effectively allowed the government to pick
and choose which topics of fighting words were acceptable
and which were not. (“Fighting words” is a term for a category
of speech first recognized as proscribable by the Supreme
Court in Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire and is defined by the
Court as words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”)6 As Justice
Antonin Scalia explained in his opinion for the Court, this law
could create a situation in which one side of a debate could say
whatever it wanted to, whereas the other side could not—he
explains this by presenting a hypothetical situation in which a
person could say “that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are”; and so Catholics would be
permitted to use whatever language they like, but anti-Catholics would be limited to tamer speech.7
In the second case, Virginia, the Court examined a law
which “makes it a felony ‘for any person … , with the intent
of intimidating any person or group … , to burn … a cross on
the property of another, a highway or other public place,’ and
specifies that ‘[a]ny such burning … shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group.’”8 The Supreme Court held that intimidation is a legitimate exception to
First Amendment protection, as well as that states could specifically ban cross burning when the intent of the cross burning
is to intimidate; however, the Court found the statute unconstitutional as it was written, because of its prima facie assumption that cross burning was always intended to intimidate.9 In

6

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.
8
Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343 (2003).
9
Note: prima facie comes from the Latin for “at first sight,” and
means that something is taken to be true unless proved otherwise.
7
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her opinion for the court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained that “the act of burning a cross may mean that a person
is engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation, or it
may mean only that the person is engaged in core political
speech.” 10 In other words, to assume that cross burning in
every case is intended to intimidate could be to punish someone who burned a cross not in order to intimidate, but rather
to make a point that contributes to political discussion. Interestingly, the court held that cross burning could be specifically
banned because of the historical association of cross burning
with the Ku Klux Klan, known for its extreme racial violence
and hate speech, but that this was consistent with the decision
in R.A.V. because the Virginia statute did not specify that cross
burning was illegal when intended to intimidate based on religion, race or sex; it simply restricted cross burning in all cases
in which it was intended to intimidate.
The Virginia decision could be seen as a victory for
supporters of hate speech regulation, and it is certainly more
of a victory than R.A.V., but, as we will see below, its failure
to specifically condemn racially biased hate speech and the
Court’s rejection that cross burning can be taken to always imply intimidation, despite the fact that the Court acknowledged
its association with racial violence and intimidation, means
that it is not the direct kind of restriction on hate speech that
hate speech regulation advocates desire.
A Classic Free Speech Argument
As mentioned above, in the United States’ infancy the
Supreme Court likely would not have been as opposed to specific content discrimination in either state or federal law as it
For more clarification, see the entry on Prima facie in the Wex legal dictionary from Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/prima_facie.
10

Virginia v. Black
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is today. While it might seem unbelievable to us now, in 1798
the Senate passed a bill which criminalized “any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress…
or the President.”11 Called the Sedition Act, this law was a direct content restriction on negative writings about the government. The arguments used in the United States for shifting
away from laws such as the Sedition Act echo arguments
found in John Stuart Mill’s book On Liberty, published in
1859. In this book, Mill argues that (almost) no speech should
be regulated, because all speech, even speech that is considered “false and pernicious,” can contribute to the exchange of
ideas and pursuit of truth.12 Mill sees three reasons not to regulate speech in general. First, he argues that “all silencing of
discussion is an assumption of infallibility”;13 that is to say,
when the government chooses to punish certain speech or
ideas, it is assuming that it knows what the correct opinion
should be. Mill notes that throughout history, historical figures
that in Mill’s day were considered great teachers, such as Jesus
and Socrates, were executed for spreading supposedly bad
ideas in the time periods in which they lived.14 Another reason
Mill provides to not regulate even negatively-viewed speech
is that often, the so-called false opinion and so-called true
opinion both contain part of the truth; he claims that it is rare
that one is completely true and the other completely false and,
therefore, access to both sides of an argument are necessary in
order to come to the truth.15
Mill’s next reason not to regulate any kind of speech
is that any opinion, “however true… if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed… will be held as a dead
11

Lewis, Freedom for the Thought That we Hate, 11.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport (Hackett,
1978), 18–19.
13
Mill, On Liberty, 17.
14
Mill, 23.
15
Mill, 44.
12
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dogma, not a living truth.”16 Mill explains that, in order for an
idea not to become a dead dogma (that is, a kind of blindly,
unquestioningly accepted catechism, rather than a compelling
intellectual idea), those who hold that idea must be exposed to
objections to that idea. What’s more, he argues, in order for
the hearer to receive the “most plausible and most persuasive
form” of the opposing argument, the objections must be presented by those who believe the so-called false view, rather
than by someone who simply knows the argument but does not
believe it.17 This would require those holding the false idea to
be allowed to speak their beliefs exactly as they believe them,
rather than presenting the idea in a tame, third-person kind of
way.
Mill was specifically concerned with the kind of silencing of religious and political discussion present in England
and the early United States. Historical speech laws often included what would be categorized as content-based restrictions on speech that today we recognize as valuable, such
as political and religious dissent. By restricting certain content, these laws regulated the ideas presented in the speech,
rather than simply the aggressive nature or fighting-word status of such speech, and were legitimized by arguments that the
regulated speech was either untrue or of such offensive nature
that it should not be permitted in public discourse. Understanding this context of speech repression is important to understanding why Mill argued in favor of nearly total freedom
of speech and why it is now so difficult to argue for regulation
directed at a specific subject of speech in the United States,
even when the speech is deeply offensive and recognized to be
based on untruth, as racially-biased hate speech is.
It should be noted that Mill allows for some speech (or
actions in general) to be regulated when such action or speech

16
17

Mill, 34.
Mill, On Liberty, 35.
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would cause specific harm to others.18 This idea is often called
the harm principle. (It can be argued that hate speech directly
causes harm to others, both physically and mentally, although,
since Mill’s focus was not on hate speech, he does not address
this possibility; I will address this idea further in the subsequent sections of this paper.) Mill’s only example of a case in
which speech causes justly regulable harm is the case of a man
inciting an angry mob by declaring that “corn dealers are starvers of the poor.” 19 Mill explains that, in this case, the speech
is not regulable because of the idea it expresses, but rather because it occurs in front of an angry mob gathered at the house
of a corn dealer and will most likely incite them to harm the
corn dealer; to Mill, such speech would be acceptable if it did
not occur in that specific context.20 Because much of what is
considered hate speech by its broadest definition (which
would include not only angry incitements to violence but also
racist speech in general) is not presented in a directly comparable manner to this example, it would seem that Mill would
only support regulating hate speech that can be seen as a direct
incitement to harm, if he were to enter the discussion today.
Mill’s harm principle is similar in many ways to the fightingwords doctrine discussed in Chaplinksy, R.A.V. and Virginia,
because the nature of fighting words is to either incite or inflict
harm.
An Argument from Critical Race Theory
Those who support regulation of racially charged hate
speech, whether embodied in state legal codes or in the rules
of public colleges, find themselves in a tight spot in the face
of the reversal of historical speech laws and current legal doc18

Mill, 9.
Mill, On Liberty, 53.
20
Mill, 54.
19
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trine on hate speech. Although advocates of hate speech restrictions want such restrictions not to end political discussion,
but rather to protect those people who have historically been
subject to extreme discrimination and violence based on their
membership in minority groups (for example, race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation), such advocates are often designated as “thought police” by opponents, a designation that
implies that they do not support open discussion.21 In this section, I want to examine the view held by some of the most
outspoken supporters of hate speech regulation, the critical
race theorists, and why they think that racially biased hate
speech can be treated as an exception to the rule that government cannot implement content-based restrictions on speech.
Critical race theory is based on six “defining elements,” presented in Words That Wound as follows:
Critical race theory recognizes that racism is endemic
to American life…. Critical race theory expresses
skepticism toward dominant legal claims of neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy….
Critical race theory challenges ahistoricism and insists on a contextual/historical analysis of the law….
Critical race theory insists on recognition of the experiential knowledge of people of color… in analyzing law and society…. Critical race theory is interdisciplinary and eclectic…. [and] Critical race theory
works toward the end of eliminating racial oppression as part of the broader goal of ending all forms of
oppression.22

21

Charles R. Lawrence III et. al, eds., introduction to Words That
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First
Amendment, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 2.
22
Lawrence et. al, introduction to Words that Wound, 6.
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Based on these beliefs and goals, critical race theorists argue
that racially biased hate speech can be legitimately singled out
for restriction, despite the fact that this would create a contentbased restriction, because of the long history of racial discrimination such speech embodies and because eliminating such
speech would help alleviate the still-existing problems faced
by racial minorities today. The critical race theorists often provide personal examples of being subjected to hate speech in
order to support their claims; one such example is a “rash of
hate tracts [that]… appeared in [their] mail,” an experience
which caused them to “[walk] more quickly to [their] cars after
late nights at the office and [to glance] more often over [their]
shoulders as [they] jogged the trails around [their] campuses.”23 Charles Lawrence III provides another personal example, writing about a hate speech incident directed at his own
family members in which racist drawings, slurs and threats
were written at the school where his sister and nephews
worked and attended classes, respectively. 24 Though some
may argue that crude, slur-filled drawings or anonymous tracts
may not constitute a true threat, or may only happen rarely and
therefore not be a widespread enough issue for laws to be specifically directed at racially biased speech, for critical race theorists, the association of such speech with lynching and racial
discrimination, and the extreme fear caused by being targeted
by such speech, warrants laws that explicitly target racial hate
speech. Lawrence notes that hate speech has a silencing effect
on those it targets; although supposedly still free to speak, the
shock of being the target of hate speech renders the person targeted unable to respond or participate in the discussion at
hand, as was the case for one of Lawrence’s students, who
23

Lawrence et. al, 7.
Charles R. Lawrence III, “If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus” in Words That Wound: Critical Race
Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J.
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 73.

24
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found himself unable to respond when being verbally attacked
for being gay.25 This demonstrates another side of the critical
race theorists’ argument for hate speech regulation, which is
that the regulation of hate speech may actually be more conducive to a culture of free, open discussion.
Critical race theorists do not necessarily agree on the
extent to which hate speech should be regulated by law; Mari
J. Matsuda, for example, argues that hate speech restriction
should focus on speech where “the message is of racial inferiority… the message is directed at a historically oppressed
group… [and] the message is persecutory, hateful, and degrading.”26 Such a definition of hate speech, although appealing to
those who support the critical race theorists’ goals, would naturally create the problem of one-sided debate that Justice
Scalia warned of in R.A.V. and would likely be too broad a
definition of hate speech to successfully use for legislation.
On the other hand, Charles R. Lawrence III advocates legislation that defines proscribable speech simply as “face-to-face
racial vilification.”27 Lawrence’s description of such speech
echoes the “fighting words” doctrine mentioned above, which
was first presented by the United States Supreme Court in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, but focuses it directly at racially biased hate speech. In fact, Lawrence’s definition of
hate speech would support a law almost exactly like the law
thrown out in R.A.V.; it seems that in response to the court’s
decision, Lawrence would counter that racially biased hate
speech can be specifically targeted as long as the law is
worded in a way that allows both sides of any race debate to
have protection. Based on Lawrence’s definition, it does not
25

Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” 53.
Mari J. Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story” in Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, ed. Mari J.
Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 36.
27
Lawrence, “If He Hollers Let Him Go,” 87.
26
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matter if one is a member of a racial group that has been historically ostracized or has historically been the one that ostracizes—Lawrence, unlike Matsuda, does not specify that hate
speech regulation should punish only hate speech directed at
members of historically oppressed racial groups, and in this
way better avoids the one-sidedness that Scalia lamented in
R.A.V. while still advocating for law that restricts racial hate
speech as a category.
Modern Counter-Arguments to Critical Race Theorists
Modern defenders of free speech who oppose critical
race theorists present a number of reasons not to legislate
against racially biased hate speech beyond those provided in
the Supreme Court’s decisions and by Mill.
First, some opponents of hate speech regulation counter that government regulations on racist hate speech are unwarranted because such regulations deny respect for the autonomy of the speaker, which is a key foundation for the
legitimacy of our government. As C. Edwin Baker argues, “the
legitimacy of the state depends on its respect for people’s
equality and autonomy and… as a purely formal matter, the
state only respects people’s autonomy if it allows people in
their speech to express their own values – no matter what these
values are.”28 That is to say, a government is only legitimate if
it allows people to speak their mind completely and to make
choices for themselves in what to think, even if their ideas are
hateful and offensive. It follows from this that to restrict hate
speech, although it may appear to be a good decision, would
be to destroy the legitimacy of the government. Baker agrees
with critical race theorists that the government must also protect the equality of its citizens, but he adds that this does not
28

C. Edwin Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” in Extreme
Speech and Democracy, ed. Ivan Hare and James Weinstein, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 142.
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mean that the government should punish private citizens for
saying things that “[do] not respect others’ equality and dignity.”29 Such speech is, to Baker, a matter of choice and personal belief, rather than a substantial infringement on the
rights of minorities, and therefore the government should not
have a say in what people say and believe. The tendency of
past governments to dictate what people could or could not say
and believe is the reason we have today developed such a
strong aversion to speech regulation, and to Baker there is
more substantial ground to argue that the governments’ restriction of hate speech infringes on a person’s right to autonomy than to argue that an individual’s use of hate speech infringes on the rights of the individual (or group) targeted by
the hate speech.
Another opponent of hate speech regulation, John T.
Bennett, also addresses critical race theorists’ arguments for
hate speech regulation. In addition to arguing that government
should not dictate what can or cannot be said, Bennett questions the evidence of harms from hate speech. Bennett does
not deny that there is any evidence whatsoever of harm from
hate speech; however, he denies that this evidence is so strong
as to warrant hate speech regulation. Bennett asserts that one
such harm attributed to hate speech, which is social inequality,
is not attributable to hate speech and racism after all, but rather
to “cultural norms that are unrelated to racism.”30 Bennett calls
this view the “cultural perspective” and explains that “the cultural perspective finds that…various inequalities are caused in
large part by the distinct norms, habits, and lifestyles of different people within different communities.”31 Bennett claims in
29

Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 143.
John T. Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech: A Critique of the
Empirical and Legal Bases of Hate Speech Regulation,” Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 43 (2016): 478, https://advancelexis-com.libproxy.furman.edu/api/permalink/57c4e61b-1f10416a-bf13-9586bf0beb9e/?context=1516831.
31
Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 468.
30
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opposition to critical race theorists that inequality as it exists
in the United States today is not caused by inherent structural
racism, but rather by “varying norms, habits, preferences, and
conscious decisions” taken by members of the minority racial
groups that currently experience unequal outcomes compared
to members of the majority racial group.32 Put more simply,
Bennett argues that the inequality experienced today by people
who have historically been discriminated against because of
their race is not because of the lingering effects of racism in
society; instead, he argues that minorities have caused the current inequality through their own decisions, and implies that
blaming these problems on racism, and specifically racist
speech, is to shift the focus onto the wrong problem.
Bennett explains further that another harm attributed
to hate speech, psycho-emotional harm, is also problematic,
because it is a difficult harm to measure, because it is inherently subjective, and because, according to him, research into
this harm does not show that hate speech causes long-term
psychological harm.33 He writes, in an explanation of a study
which attempted to determine whether hate speech negatively
impacts self-esteem of young Blacks in the long term using
data gathered between 1960 and 1998, “if hate speech in
American society is causing psycho-emotional harm, this has
not led to a measurable impact on self-reported self-esteem.”34
Bennett does not deny that those who are targeted by hate
speech experience any harm whatsoever, but rather argues that
the evidence of long-lasting harm is not strong enough to warrant the level of strict hate speech regulation some critical race
theorists want.
Bennett also notes that critical race theorists use empirical data which is gathered by academics who “suffer from
32

Bennett, 469.
Bennett, “The Harm in Hate Speech,” 487.
34
Bennett, 487.
33
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deeply rooted and longstanding ideological bias.” 35 Bennett
explains that this bias takes two forms: first, he claims that
many proponents of hate speech regulation “exaggerate the
prevalence of racism and sexism in American life,” even as
racism itself has declined and anti-racism has become the
norm.36 Second, Bennett notes that this bias results in the exclusion of conservative academics, who (like Bennett) might
question the prevalence of hate speech and the necessity to
regulate it. 37 According to Bennett, the currently accepted
opinion on hate speech among academics has already created
a culture of speech where, even though certain ideas and
speech may not be illegal, people are afraid to speak their
minds because of the possibility of being socially punished—
not for using racially-charged hate speech, but rather for arguing that such speech may not need to be regulated.
Both Baker and Bennett also address the argument
that hate speech causes harm, and must therefore be regulated,
by countering that hate speech regulations may worsen the
problems that proponents of hate speech regulations want to
fix. For example, Bennett notes that hate speech regulations
would be likely to negatively impact racial harmony in the
United States. He explains that “if hate speech laws were enacted, reasonable people would perceive racial favoritism in
their implementation,” meaning that hate speech regulation
would be likely to increase animosity between racial groups,
because such regulations, as presented by scholars such as
Matsuda, would likely favor one racial group over another.38
Baker agrees with this, noting that “speech prohibitions can
increase… racist individuals’ or groups’ sense of oppression
and, thereby, sense that they must act.”39 He also asserts that
35

Bennett, 471.
Bennett, 474.
37
Bennett, 473.
38
Bennett, “”The Harm in Hate Speech,” 531.
39
Baker, “Autonomy and Hate Speech,” 152.
36
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regulation of hate speech will make it more difficult to identify
potential perpetrators of racial violence, because such regulations will force proponents of hate speech to go underground
and thereby become harder to trace. 40 So, instead of hate
speech regulation protecting minority groups from harm,
Baker and Bennett argue that hate speech regulations will ultimately cause more harm.
My Response to the Above Arguments
My own view on hate speech regulation recognizes
that freedom of speech is a necessary and important freedom
in any country that claims to value the rights of the people who
live there; however, I agree with the critical race theorists that
racially biased hate speech should be an exception to the rule
and that states can legitimately write laws that punish extreme
racial hate speech.
Before completely laying out my own view, I need to
respond to the arguments against hate speech restriction that
were presented above. First, in response to Mill: Mill argues
that all speech must be allowed in order to pursue truth. Although I agree that the search for truth is important, I think it is
difficult to argue that hate speech seriously contributes to the
pursuit of truth. Of course, there is a possibility of discriminatory, racist speech which may appear to contribute to this
search for truth, such as in a story that Mari Matsuda calls
“The Case of the Dead-Wrong Social Scientist,” in which a
racist argument is portrayed as having scientific backing and
is presented in a classroom or lecture setting, thereby bearing
resemblance to actual academic debate and pursuit of truth.41
However, I think even Mill would be hard-pressed to show
what benefit or hint of the truth could be found in yelling derogatory names, burning crosses in black families’ yards, or
40
41

Baker, 152.
Matsuda, “Public Response to Racist Speech,” 40-41.
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drawing pictures of swastikas outside dorm rooms. At least the
social scientist, in presenting his racially biased views in an
academic manner, puts forth his argument in the kind of setting that allows for discussion; that is to say, by presenting his
views in an academic setting, he seems to invite the possibility
of the kind of discussion of ideas Mill wants us to have. On
the other hand, racist speech that takes the form of a slur, a
display of a hateful symbol, or an act of vandalism does not
ask for engagement; it seeks to intimidate others into fear and
silence.
Also, banning hate speech and banning disagreement
are not necessarily the same thing. Or, they do not have to be.
Part of the fear addressed above is that hate speech will be so
broadly defined as to include speech that should be protected,
including speech that is merely in opposition to the prevailing
view. This is one of the potential problems with Matsuda’s
definition of hate speech. A number of claims made specifically by Bennett could be considered racist by his readers, regardless of whether he is trying to be racist or not, and there
are those would argue that all even vaguely racist speech is
hate speech. Such an argument would make it possible for
these readers to accuse Bennett of hate speech, even though it
seems a stretch to call what he says hate speech compared to
the more extreme examples of hate speech already mentioned.
This reveals a need to define hate speech specifically, in order
to avoid creating a culture where those who may not intend to
cause harm feel like they cannot speak, because they cannot
ask questions or challenge prevailing views without being accused of hate speech. For this reason, I find myself leaning
toward Lawrence’s definition of hate speech as “face-to-face
racial vilification.”42 However, I would ensure the definition
included acts that might not be strictly face-to-face, such as
posting up a poster with demeaning racial images, or displaying symbols, such as the swastika or a burning cross, which
42
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would likely cause emotional harm by their proximity to members of minority groups. Either way, a narrower definition of
hate speech would allow those with unpopular, and even potentially racist, opinions to still speak their opinions—they just
would not be able to use words that inherently harm or silence
others in order to express these opinions.
Of course, narrowly defining hate speech and recognizing that hate speech does not contribute to a pursuit of truth
does not seem enough to satisfy Baker and Bennett. Baker says
that the government must respect its citizens’ autonomy by allowing them to speak their opinions freely and argues that this
respect must be maintained “irrespective of how this expressive content harms other people.”43 This may just be an unfortunate wording, although it is interesting that, when presenting
possible evidence that might convince him that hate speech
regulation would be beneficial, Baker only suggests that he
would be convinced by evidence showing that hate speech incites racist acts (by racists), and he does not mention that he
would be convinced if he was shown evidence that hate speech
harmed its targets in and of itself. 44 Allowing someone to
speak even if it causes harm to another person seems to go
directly against the purpose of government. I agree with Baker
that the government must respect the autonomy of its citizens;
however, the law must put some limits on a person’s autonomy
in order to protect other people; this is, of course, why there
are laws against stealing and murder, and why pedophiles cannot use the argument of sexual autonomy to justify sexual acts
with minors. A person’s freedom of choice to act ends when
their action harms another person.
Hidden within Baker’s statement that speech must be
freely allowed regardless of harm, is the argument that speech
does not cause true harm in the same way that murder, stealing, and sexual abuse cause harm. This is interesting, as Baker
43
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seemingly disagrees with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chaplinsky, because the Court’s definition of fighting words,
as quoted above, recognizes that certain words can cause
harm.
Bennett’s specific arguments against hate speech, on
the other hand, are somewhat more controversial. First, his argument that inequality is not caused by racism seems quite
false; even if it is true that not all current inequality is caused
directly by racism, there are cases where racism can be shown
to underly situations of inequality. This can be seen specifically in the higher incarceration rates of Blacks for drug
crimes, despite whites being a larger portion of the drug user
population, as well as in more severe sentences for Blacks versus whites when similar crimes are committed.45 Second, Bennett, unlike Baker, allows that hate speech may cause actual
harm to those targeted by it, but he denies that it is enough
harm to warrant restriction. It is interesting to note that the
study Baker uses to demonstrate that hate speech does not
cause long-term harm focuses on the impact of hate speech on
self-esteem, and does not address other long-term psychoemotional harms that may occur, such as fear of going to certain locations (such as a classroom or a dorm where one was
subject to hate speech). It seems both Bennett and Baker reject
the personal experience of those targeted by racist hate speech.
If you ask the Black family who was directly targeted by the
burning cross at the heart of the controversy in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, would they say there was no long-term psychological
harm? In the example mentioned above, in which Lawrence’s
family was targeted by racist drawings, he writes that, on vis-
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iting his family after the incident, the pain and injury was obvious, that “their faces betrayed the aftershock of a recently
inflicted blow and a newly discovered vulnerability.”46 Could
Bennett and Baker deny that such an experience would not
have long-term effects on Lawrence’s family, especially the
children who realized they went to school with people who
were willing to say such things about them? It is possible that
more commonplace, subtle racist speech may not have measurable long-term effects (although I am not totally convinced
this is true), but it seems difficult and wrong to deny the individual experience of those targeted directly by the most violent
and direct instances of hate speech.
The question also arises of why it matters to have racially biased hate speech regulation specifically, if such hate
speech could fall under legislation, such as the law in Virginia,
that regulates fighting words in general. Simply proscribing
hate speech within more general fighting words laws might
appeal to Bennett, since, as discussed above, he says that reasonable people will see restrictions that specifically regulate
hate speech as favoring one side over another, and that academics who support such legislation are deeply biased. Bennett is probably right in saying that racial hate speech ordinances will tend to favor one side over another, even if not
written in a way that asks for such one-sided application, seeing as it likely would be more difficult (but not impossible) for
a white person to show that she is the victim of hate speech
than it would be for a Black person, Jewish person, or person
of any other minority group. It is also more likely that people
of color will bring up allegations of hate speech and win, because people of color are more often targeted by hate speech
and hate crimes (however, it should be noted again that whites
would also be able to be recognized as victims of hate speech
under the kind of hate speech laws I am arguing for, just as
whites can and have been recognized as victims of hate crimes
46
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under current hate crime laws).47 This seemingly unfair application comes about because derogatory speech and symbols
directed at a white person do not carry with them the same
history of oppression that such speech directed at a person of
another race would. However, this same history of oppression
is exactly what motivates those academics who support hate
speech regulation. They may appear to be biased, but this is
because most critical race theorists are themselves members of
minority groups who have experienced extreme discrimination in United States history; in a sense, regulation specifically
directed at hate speech is a small way of making up for the
hundreds of years in which people of color were excluded
from government, openly discriminated against, enslaved, and
beaten all because of their ethnicity and skin color.
Again, I admit that this sort of argument can be
viewed as biased against a specific category of disfavored
speech; however, I do not think there is inherently something
wrong with different treatment of disfavored speech in this
case. Hate speech is different from other sorts of disfavored
speech, such as anti-government and anti-war speech, which
have also been historically been targeted by speech regulation
in the United States.48 The latter two forms of speech are political speech which attack the government and can reasonably
be seen to contribute to the search for truth because of their
nature as political speech. However, racially biased hate
speech specifically attacks people based on nothing other than
their race, and, as mentioned above, cannot reasonably be considered a part of the search for truth.
I need to also address Baker and Bennett’s arguments
that hate speech regulation will unintentionally cause more
47
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harm. Bennett’s reason for this argument relates to the argument just mentioned, which is that “reasonable people would
perceive racial favoritism in their implementation.”49 As I already said, I think this is true, but I also think many reasonable
people are capable of recognizing that the problem addressed
by hate speech regulation carries with it a history that allows
for an exception to the rule that law cannot be biased against
certain ideas. And even if reasonable people disagree with this
(I will not claim that Bennett or Baker are unreasonable people), they are unlikely to lash out at minority groups if hate
speech laws are enacted. The problem, then, seems to lie with
unreasonable people; that is to say, those who want to use the
most violent hate speech: hate groups, such as Neo-Nazis and
white supremacists. As mentioned before, Baker says that hate
speech regulation will cause such unreasonable people to feel
attacked and “increase… [their] sense that they must act,” as
well as force them to move underground where their ideas can
fester.50 This is a difficult argument to counter. First, I argue
that hate speech regulation would not necessarily force these
groups entirely underground, because, as I have already admitted, I do not think that hate speech regulation can be
worded to include every instance of racist speech, but only the
most hurtful forms of direct racial vilification. Second, if by
increasing the sense that they must act, Baker means that these
groups will be prompted to use more violence, then that simply
goes to show that racist ideas in fact are still prevalent enough
to cause concern, which disproves Bennett’s assertion that racism is no longer a big enough issue to warrant hate speech legislation. Also, even though hate groups might claim that being
targeted by hate speech regulation is a legitimate reason to use
violence, such an argument would not hold up in any court.
This may show that the government needs to do a better job of
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identifying and monitoring those who might be likely to commit hate crimes, but it does not show that we should not protect
the victims of hate speech by directly punishing hate speech
through legislation. It seems more important to protect those
that are actually harmed by hate speech, rather than those who
might perceive that they are somehow harmed by its regulation.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the debate over hate speech regulation is
difficult to resolve, and it is admittedly likely that racism will
find ways to persist even if we accept the need for hate speech
regulation and enact laws restricting such speech. Despite
these difficulties, the battle to criminalize hate speech is worthy to be fought, as it provides a way for the United States and
its state governments to both protect minorities from the very
real harm that comes from being targeted by hate speech and
to legally recognize the crimes such speech has historically encouraged and embodied as wrong. The goal of hate speech restriction is not to end debate; hate speech regulation, specifically limited to racially-biased fighting words and “face-toface vilification,” will still allow for free expression of even
racist ideas; but it will require that the expression of such ideas
not occur in such a way to inflict harm on the minority groups
who have already suffered so much harm throughout United
States history. I would love to live in a world where hate
speech regulation is not necessary, but as I have shown, we do
not yet live in such a world. It is for these reasons that I not
only argue we need hate speech regulation, but that I also disagree with the Court’s decisions in R.A.V. and Virginia and
conclude that the Court should allow future such laws to remain in place, rather than declare them unconstitutional.
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DISMANTLING POWER STRUCTURES:
A FOUCAULDIAN EXAMINATION OF PHYLLIDA LLOYD’S
ALL-FEMALE SHAKESPEARE TRILOGY

Emily Enlow
T. E. Phyllida Lloyd’s trilogy of Julius Caesar (2012),
Henry IV (2014), and The Tempest (2016) produced at Donmar
Warehouse in London (which was filmed at the conclusion of
the five-year project) successfully tells Shakespeare’s stories
using a company of female actors who not only take on the
roles called for in the scripts, but also the roles of inmates in a
women’s prison. In an interview for Shakespeare Unlimited, a
podcast sponsored by the Folger Shakespeare Library, Lloyd
explained that the company worked with Holloway Prison in
London to dive deeper into the implications of their choice of
setting. She said that through the development process the
“prison became less a device and more absolutely fundamental
to [their] mission.”1 What began as a project meant to provide
a wider range of opportunities for women within the Shakespeare canon became a vehicle to highlight the struggles of
inmates limited by the penal system and their pasts. And, not
surprisingly, we can come to a better understanding of these
struggles if we think about these productions in terms of the
ideas of French philosopher Michel Foucault.
Foucault was one of the most prominent figures in the
post-structuralist era of literary criticism. He wrote Discipline
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison to investigate the penal
system, identify its origins, and question how it may be reformed. Foucault discusses the power structures at play within
1
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a prison as a microcosm of society and how those power structures are perpetuated. Applying his ideas to Lloyd’s trilogy illuminates that her production concept links the power structures of Shakespeare’s plays to the power structures in prisons,
which, in turn, highlights the heightened circumstances of incarcerated women.
The plays, as one can imagine, are aesthetically rather
dreary. Grey sets and costumes, as well as harsh overhead
lighting and found objects, are used to create the prison. However, this design is effective in emphasizing the barrenness of
prison life and forcing a focus on the stories being told. It is
clear that each actor in the company has a deep understanding
of not only the Shakespearean character they embody, but also
the character of the inmate who performs from within her
prison confines in all three productions.
To supplement the trilogy, the company put together
an educational packet that includes a video diary featuring
monologues from the point of view of the inmate characters.
The actors wrote the monologues after meeting with the incarcerated women in the prison that were selected to work with
Lloyd. These monologues give interested audiences more context for the prison setting and tell the stories of the fictional
incarcerated characters behind the Shakespearean characters.
Most notable of these diaries is that of Hannah, an inmate
played by Dame Harriet Walter (who, Lloyd noted in her
Shakespeare Unlimited interview, inspired the trilogy).2 Hannah plays Brutus in Julius Caesar, King Henry in Henry IV,
and Prospero in The Tempest. She serves as the leader of the
drama group and as a mentor for the younger women in the
company. In Walter’s video diary (in character as Hannah),
she describes the process of rehearsing the plays. She delves
into how she and the other women were stripped of their identities when they were incarcerated, becoming just a number,

2
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“an offender” instead of an individual. But the plays themselves act as “purgative” for the (fictional) inmates as they reform and learn to grow within the confines of the prison.3 In
this sense, the plays reveal the kinds of power, however limited, the women could exercise for themselves. And this is a
key element in Foucault’s philosophy of power.
Foucault defines power as a verb, not a noun. To him,
it is not a possession, but something one enacts. He says, “it
is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant
class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions.”4 In other
words, power is the culmination of an action and the effects of
that action on another person or group of people. Everyone
can, and does, exercise power, even if they’re not in a privileged position. The ability to exercise power is made possible
through continuous demonstrations of power that are accepted
by those being acted upon, effectively maintaining the structure.
Lloyd’s trilogy centers around such demonstrations of
power that permeate the lives of the incarcerated women. At
the start of Donmar’s Julius Caesar, inmate Charday (played
by Jade Anouka) welcomes the audience saying, “We’ve chosen the plays for our trilogy because they’re the ones that connected to our stories.”5 Julius Caesar tells the story of taking
down a corrupt government only to be replaced by a new one,
demonstrating the cyclical nature of power-grabbing. Henry
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IV explores the line between peasantry and royalty and questions if one can be honorable and common. The Tempest,
though the most fantastical of the three stories, stays grounded
in its examination of isolation and servitude. The themes of
power, justice, and freedom that permeate all three plays are
only amplified when the actors represent women who are incarcerated.
Though there are certainly oppressive power structures present in all three of the plays chosen for the trilogy,
Shakespeare capitalizes on the Foucauldian notion of power as
a verb rather than a noun. In The Tempest, Prospero demonstrates power over Ariel by binding them to servitude with the
promise eventual freedom. Ariel does his bidding because they
believe if they work hard enough and do what they are asked,
they will escape servitude.6 It can be said, then, that Ariel is
complicit in Prospero’s exercises of power and, therefore, exercises power of their own. Ariel implicates this early on in
Act One of the play by saying the following:
All hail, great master, grave sir, hail! I come
To answer thy best pleasure; be’t to fly,
To swim, to dive into the fire, to ride
On the curl’d clouds. To thy strong bidding, task
Ariel and all his quality. (I.ii.189-193)7
Ariel chooses to operate within Prospero’s system and assert
their magical powers over others (a physical demonstration of
power, rather than power granted by a privileged position).
Shakespeare’s Henry IV revolves around two men
fighting for a position of power, but the action that leads up to
that provides more complex examples of power-grabbing.
Prince Hal has a privileged position of power as a royal, but
6
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Hal exercises power by subverting that position, “mak[ing] offense a skill”.8 He chooses to steal and drink instead of performing his princely duties, knowing that he will never face
the consequences of a common man (like fines or arrests).9 He
waits to own up to his privileged position in hopes that, after
behaving as a ne’er-do-well, his acts as prince will come as a
shock and make him seem more successful. Hal summarizes
this plot in one of his most famous speeches:
I know you all, and will a while uphold
The unyok’d humor of your idleness,
Yet herein will I imitate the sun,
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds
To smother up his beauty from the world,
That when he please again to be himself,
Being wanted, he may be more wond’red at
By breaking through the foul and ugly mists
Of vapors that did seem to strangle him.
(I.ii.195-203)
Like Prince Hal, Falstaff challenges his status in life
and the power structures of his society. Falstaff does not have
a position of power, but consistently exercises power in a Foucauldian sense by undermining those who actually have authority. Shakespeare gives Falstaff, seemingly the lowest on
the social totem pole, one of the largest demonstrations of
power in the play: acting as a father and counsel for Hal when
Hal dismisses King Henry.10 Because he is a thief and a drunkard, however, Falstaff is not always successful in his exercises
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of power. At the conclusion of the play, Hal steps into his position of power and abandons Falstaff,11 an act Falstaff does
not challenge because the existing power structure dictates
that he must remain docile or face consequences.
Similarly to Henry IV, Julius Caesar questions if there
is such a thing as ideal power and, if so, what that power looks
like. Caesar is unpopular and, therefore, those ranked below
him choose to exercise their power against him. Early in the
play, Cassius explains to Brutus that Caesar is no more fit to
rule than they are, claiming,
The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.
Brutus and Caesar: what should be in that “Caesar”?
Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
Write them together, yours is as fair a name;
Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well;
Weigh them, it is as heavy; conjure with ‘em,
“Brutus” will start a spirit as soon as “Caesar.”
Now in the name of all the gods at once,
Upon what meat doth this our Caesar feed
That he is grown so great? (I.ii.140-150)12
Discontent rises and the senators kill Caesar in favor
of a better leader, exercising power from below, but the existing power structure doesn’t die with him. Caesar’s successor
challenges Cassius and Brutus and no real change is made. In
that, Shakespeare suggests, aligning with a Foucauldian paradigm of power, that there will never be an “ideal” leader because power will always come from everyone, not just a single
body.
11
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With all three productions set in a prison, a looming
power structure is apparent between the guards and the inmates acting in the plays. The act of the inmates performing
the plays, however, is an exercise of power that reinforces
Foucauldian ideals rather than the traditional concept of power
typically associated with the prison complex. The guards exhibit their power by leading the inmates in and out of the playing space, making sure the women stay in line and conform.
In fact, the plays are only allowed to be performed (in the
world of the prison) because the guards permit the inmates to
participate in Hannah’s drama club, but the threat of the performance being taken away is always an underlying possibility
if people misbehave.
This assumption is confirmed in Henry IV during the
tavern scene where Mistress Quickly is antagonized and the
inmates go off script. They add in a bit that they had supposedly rehearsed and agreed to cut where they call the inmate
playing Mistress Quickly “an otter” because she is “slippery”
in her sex life and use derogatory anatomical slang which
sends the inmate playing Quickly off stage crying. A guard
enters, followed by Hannah (who has stepped out of her character of King Henry), to assess the situation. The guard says
nothing, but her presence makes the inmates visibly uncomfortable. She represents an upset in the power structure and an
attempt to regain control. Hannah reminds the inmates to behave and “stick to the Shakespeare,” then exercising power
which has been granted to her because the other inmates respect her. Unlike the authoritative imposed power of the
guard, Hannah’s exhibition of power is defensive and, therefore, well-received. 13 In this instance, Hannah is defending the
power of the play and the power the inmates have exercised in
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their performance that allows them to rise above their circumstances and create their own meaning out of Shakespeare’s
texts.
Similarly, in The Tempest, Hannah (this time playing
Prospero) exercises her power to defend the powers of the
play. Prospero delivers the famous “we are such stuff as
dreams are made on” speech while popping large balloons
that, only moments before, were used as the backdrop for projections of the dreams of the inmates, including the golden
arches of McDonald’s and the promise of something as simple
as a cheeseburger. 14 Prospero’s balloon popping, a physical
demonstration of power, is done in order to keep the other
characters grounded in his world instead of venturing into a
vision of the world that would leave him isolated. The other
women do not challenge this act of power, effectively maintaining the overarching structure of power at play between the
characters and the inmates.
Despite this, the guards demonstrate their power in
other ways throughout the trilogy, such as interrupting the action of the plays during pivotal moments when the incarcerated women exercise power to rebel against injustice in the
existent power structure. Julius Caesar is cut short at the
crowning of Octavius because the guards, seemingly worried
that the inmates’ excitement might get out of hand, declare that
recreation time is over. After Hal renounces Falstaff in Henry
IV, the actor playing Falstaff (Sophie Stanton) begins to
scream and cry and the guards don’t allow the other inmates
to continue. The inmates hit the floor and wait for further instruction, physically demonstrating how they are below the
guards in the power structure. It can be assumed that the inmates have been trained to obey the orders of the guards unquestioningly in such situations or risk consequences. Since
14
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both of these moments of interruption occur at points when an
underdog has successfully disrupted the existing power structure, the guards step in as a reminder to the audience that the
women being watched on stage are unable to enact reform
within the power structure of the prison outside of performance. They have, however, proven that they are capable of
exercising power even though they don’t hold a privileged position, reinforcing Foucault’s notion that an act of power can
come from anyone, not just those at the top of the social pyramid.
The key example that exhibits a Foucauldian power
structure is that of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon. The panopticon is a circular prison model where a single watchtower can
see every cell in the prison. In this model, prisoners don’t
know when they’re being watched but know that they theoretically always can be seen, meaning power could be asserted
over the prisoners both physically and mentally at any time.
Foucault expands and comments upon Bentham’s model, saying the idea of the panopticon trickles into society at large, reflecting a looming authoritative body in power that cannot be
reached. This causes those being monitored to internalize the
rules of the oppressive body, which ultimately leads to a selfdisciplined society that voluntarily yields its power.15
The Lloyd trilogy effectively demonstrates the constant surveillance of the prison without distracting from the
action of the play. In all three productions, guards lead the inmates into the playing space before they begin their performance and escort them out at the play’s conclusion, staying in
the wings near the perimeter during the performance. Though
not consistently visible, they come in and out during scene
transitions or in moments of conflict in the plot. Around the
top of the audience is a fence, allowing guards and prisoners
not on stage to monitor what’s happening. On a practical level,
this reinforces the prison setting for the audience but also
15

Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 200-203.

35

Furman Humanities Review
serves to remind the inmates that though they may be escaping
their situations by putting on a character, they cannot misbehave or abuse the privilege of performance. With constant surveillance comes the threat of punishment. Julius Caesar, in
particular, uses surveillance and its potential consequences as
a tool for the story. Television monitors are present around the
space and the threat of media surveillance adds higher stakes
for the conspirators plotting against Caesar.
There’s a level of Panopticon-esque surveillance that
becomes even more prevalent when theatricality is taken into
account. In a theater, it can be argued that the audience becomes the guard in the tower watching the action of the prison
taking place but remaining distanced from the prisoners, or actors, themselves. The actors are in a position where they could
be seen by any number of the 400 audience members at any
time, whether they are the main focus of the scene or not, making it imperative to always be “on.” In other words, the power
to behave in a way that deviates from the behavior expected of
them is stripped and they, like the prisoners in the Panopticon
model, must conform to the expectations of the power structure (in this case, the expectations of what makes a good, interesting to watch actor). However, part of what makes theater
impactful is that there is power in subverting expectations.
Though actors may be expected to behave in one way, the
women in this company have exerted their power to take on
roles not written for them that challenge their and the audiences’ understanding of themselves.
Yet the audience-as-guard model isn’t the only one
that exists in the trilogy. Perhaps the audience is not in the
tower at all but instead act as the imprisoned, stuck in their
seats waiting to be called out or directly addressed without
having control over the story being handed to them and powerless when faced with the power exercised by the performers.
In Donmar’s Julius Caesar, the audience has no idea Caesar is
going to be assassinated sitting among them and they have no
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way to stop it; they sit and are forced to take it in.16 This action
places the audience in the shoes of the inmates who are consistently acted upon by an outside force and given little agency
over their situation and must find ways to exercise their power
from within. From a more purpose-driven perspective, the actors teach the audience or leave them with a message of some
sort; in this case, that message is to question the power structures in place that are being overturned by Shakespeare’s characters and the ones that limit the inmates. The audience then
has the opportunity to exercise their own power beyond the
stage using the knowledge they’ve gained from both Shakespeare’s words and the interpretation presented by Lloyd and
company.
Lloyd’s concept for the trilogy has revolutionized
contemporary Shakespeare performance by challenging gender norms on stage as well as in the eyes of society, while simultaneously calling into question the beliefs largely held about
incarcerated women and the structures within which they operate. Hannah’s supplementary inmate introduction video discussed the erasure of individual stories and lamented their
grouping into the singular category of “offender.” Lloyd and
the company of these three plays have effectively highlighted
individual stories of inmates and grounded them in universal
human truths that make it almost impossible for audience
members to avoid empathizing with both Shakespeare’s characters and the characters of the inmates. In doing this, Lloyd
has given voice to those typically oppressed by existing power
structures in prisons, on stage, and in society at large.

16

Julius Caesar, dir. Lloyd
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THE SWORD, THE STAFF, AND
WISE LEADERSHIP:
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN DANTE’S
PURGATORIO XVI

Frances North
Although often first associated with religious connotations, Dante Alighieri’s Commedia—or in modern vernacular, The Divine Comedy—also advances a clear political
agenda. Rather in the theme of the epic poets (and suitably so,
considering that his first great poetic muse is none other than
Dante’s guide in the poem, the poet Virgil), Dante weaves a
complex narrative discussion of the political and religious disarray he perceives in the world around him. Among his many
other criticisms of secular politics, Dante addresses this issue
in a critical depiction of local Florentine politics (representative of city) and Italian government (representative of state),
and a celebration of imperial Rome (representative of Empire).1 In his wider examination of the matter, however, he especially considers the proper relationship between temporal
spiritual and political authority in Purgatorio, the second book
in the Commedia. Likely responding to the political and ecclesiastical corruption caused by the politicization of religious offices in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, Dante expresses
strong (and sometimes controversial) opinions about the
proper alignment of Church and State in medieval Europe.
Dante was immersed in political thought that was influenced
1

Dante uses the terms “empire” and “monarchy” interchangeably
throughout both De Monarchia and Commedia to represent a singular, politically omnipotent governing power.
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significantly by the Augustinian notion that the “city of God”
(Church) is in constant and irreconcilable conflict with the
“city of man” (government, or State). Conversely, Dante suggests that the telos—or end—of Church and State align such
that both are essential for human fulfillment. While he clings
to this theme throughout Commedia, his analogies of the cleft
hooves and the two suns in Purgatorio XVI offer clear insight
into his belief that a proper arrangement of ecclesiastical and
imperial powers is necessary for their ideal teleological function. Read alongside Book III of his political treatise, De Monarchia, the two analogies reveal three defining characteristics
of the proper relationship between political and religious authorities: first, that there is no structural hierarchy between the
two powers; second, that each exists independent of the authority of the other; and third, that, as a result of the former
points, the structural differentiation of political and ecclesiastical authorities facilitates the fulfillment of their similar teleological ends.
Purgatorio is the second installment of Dante’s threepart epic poem, Commedia. Commedia tracks the journey of
Dante-the-Traveler (as opposed to Dante-the-Author) from
ante-Hell in Inferno to the Beatific Vision in Paradiso, touching on themes such as justice, penitence, and redemption
throughout. After emerging from the bottommost of the nine
concentric circles of Hell in Inferno, Dante and his guide, Virgil, enter the gates of Purgatorio and begin ascending the
mountain. Mt. Purgatory contains seven terraces arranged vertically, each of which represents a specific vice of which souls
are purged through contrapasso (literally, “suffering the contrary”); simultaneously, these contrapassi cultivate the virtue
which corresponds to the one being purged. The journey
through Purgatorio is thus one of growth and redemption in
addition to justice; it is a walk of spiritual maturation that
prunes the soul to prepare it for the Beatific Vision in Paradiso—the event which, according to Dante, is the fulfillment
of all human longings and needs. As such, Purgatorio provides a context for Dante’s discussion of the ground between
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virtue and vice: whereas the souls in Inferno are already
damned for eternity, and those in Paradiso have already
reached perfection, the souls in Purgatorio are in the middle
ground. It is the land of the imperfect on the way to perfection,
a process which requires criticism and justice to reach redemption. Dante embraces this notion in the criticism of the political
and religious landscape of fourteenth century Italy throughout
Purgatorio.
Purgatorio is riddled with political significance from
the beginning: within the first thirty lines of Canto 1 (and still
in ante-purgatory) Dante encounters Cato, a Roman statesman
and military leader known for choosing suicide over submission to tyranny.2 Cato’s placement at the beginning of Purgatorio is a clear political statement, since he rightfully belongs
in the seventh circle of Inferno alongside the other souls who
are damned for committing suicide. Although a highly debated
matter, most commentators argue that his saving grace is his
dedication to the virtuous polis (the Ancient Greek term for a
city-state or nation). Cato is not saved, nor is he in a state of
active purgation; but he is also not suffering. In placing Cato
at the opening to Purgatorio, Dante insinuates that proper political dispositions do play a role human fulfillment but are not
enough by themselves. The political nature of his introduction
to Purgatorio frames his later criticism of the relationship between Church and State in Purgatorio XVI.
Dante sets the stage for his criticism of the relationship
between political and religious authority in Purgatorio XVI
with the setting in which he places the dialogue between
Dante-the-traveler and Marco the Lombard at the beginning of
the canto. Upon ascending the third terrace of Mt. Purgatory
(the terrace of the wrathful), a harsh, impenetrable smog engulfs Dante in greater darkness than is found at any other point
in the poem. Under this veil, he encounters Marco the Lombard, a Venetian nobleman whose political views were likely
2

Alighieri, Dante. Purgatorio: A New Verse Translation, trans. Robert
Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: Anchor, 2002), XVI.31-39.
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sympathetic to Dante’s own, and seeks his counsel while attempting to understand the root causes of earthly depravity.
Robert Hollander argues that this unparalleled darkness represents the blinding nature of anger, an idea consistent with the
theme of this specific terrace. 3 Yet, the remarkable similarities
between the description of the smog and the language that
Marco later uses to discuss moral turpitude implies that the
smog may also be a metaphor for the effects of temporal political and ecclesiastical corruption. Just as the “barren sky” is
the source of the blinding darkness in the third terrace, so the
barrenness of virtue shrouds the world in blinding darkness.4
Explaining the reason for this barrenness, Marco engages
Dante the traveler in a brief discussion of the roles of free will,
human culpability and innocence, and astrological influence
while shrouded in the smog. Marco’s ultimate conclusion is
that “failed guidance / is the cause the world is steeped in vice,
/ and not [the] inner nature that has grown corrupt”—in other
words, the world is blind because its leaders have failed, not
because humanity has grown more decrepit. By the time he
finishes explaining this, the smog has begun to dissipate. 5
With this glimpse into the way Dante sees the world around
him as further framework, he employs the analogies of the
cleft hooves and the two suns to explain the corrupt relationship between temporal political and ecclesiastical authorities.
The conflict between papal and imperial authority first
emerges in Purgatorio XVI when Marco offers the analogy of
the cleft hooves. Discussing the importance of law for virtuous
society, he argues that the civil law that already exists cannot
be enforced effectively because “the shepherd who precedes /
may chew his cud, but does not have cleft hooves.”6 In his
1901 commentary on Purgatorio, H. F. Tozer explains that
3

Hollander, Robert. “Purgatorio XVI,” Commentaries on the Commedia Divinia. New York: Anchor, 2004: 160.
4
Purg. XVI.1-12;58-66.
5
Ibid., XVI.103-105.
6
Ibid., XVI.99.
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chewing the cud is allegory for acquiring wisdom through the
contemplation, and contends that the cleft hooves refer to a
separation of religious and political powers. 7 While Tozer
draws from the image of the beast stumbling in the mud in
Monarchia II.127-9 (which also correlates with Purgatorio
XVI.126-9) as evidence for his interpretation, he notes that
reading the analogy as an allusion to Leviticus better clarifies
its significance for the ideal relationship between Church and
State. Leviticus 11 distinguishes ceremonially clean animals
from ceremonially unclean animals. In verse 3, Moses establishes that only animals that both have “completely split
hooves and chew the cud” are ceremonially clean.8 The allusion thus compares the ceremonial uncleanliness of a camel
(which chews the cud but does not have split hooves) with the
Pope—the wise shepherd of the Church who corrupts his office by lusting after political power. Given the understanding
that consuming unclean animals defiled the consumer and alienated them from God, it seems that Dante alludes to Leviticus 11 in the analogy of the cleft hooves to suggest that the
Pope’s failure to separate political and religious powers defiled the world and undermined its potential for good.
Where Dante complains about his current political and
religious landscape in the analogy of the split hooves, he proposes an alternative balance of powers in the analogy of the
two suns, which emphasizes the ideal arrangement of Church
and State, and introduces its teleological significance. Shortly
after attributing worldly vice to failed guidance, Marco states
that, “Rome, which formed the world for good, / once had two
suns that lit the one road / and the other, the world’s and that
to God.”9 The two suns are the Pope and the emperor, who,
ideally, ought to illuminate the paths to earthly and eternal
7

H.F. Tozer. “Purgatorio XVI,” An English Commentary on
Dante’s Divinia Commedia. Ed. Andrew Shiflett (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901): 99, http://dantelab.dartmouth.edu/reader.
8
Leviticus 11:1-8, NRSV.
9
Purg. XVI.105-108
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happiness, respectively; they also identify Rome as the epitome of human government.10 Identifying Rome as the ultimate
exemplar of government establishes it as the standard to which
other governments ought to (and usually fail to) meet. The
analogy of the sword and staff reaffirms this interpretation in
the next tercet through direct reference to well-known symbols
of imperial and pastoral power: the sword represents emperor,
the staff the Pope. In addition to modifying the analogy of the
two suns to clarify potential misinterpretations assigning it any
significance other than the personification of religious and political powers, the analogy underlines the inevitable dysfunction that results from their unnatural combination: the “two,/
forced to be together, must perforce go ill.”11 The notable contrast between the association of the independent Roman ecclesiastical and political powers with light and the association of
their overlap in medieval politics with the putrid smog hovering over Purgatorio XVI insinuates that the structural separation of Church and State is more conducive to clear vision—
and therein, truth and virtue. In addition to signifying the need
for structural differentiation between religious and political
authorities, John S. Carroll argues that the analogy of the two
suns indicates that man has “a twofold end in life” which correlates with the two temporal authorities: to discover happiness in the world (emperor), and to discover eternal life
(Pope). According to Carroll, Dante evokes imperial Rome as
the epitome of earthly religious and political power and the
ultimate exemplar of political authority in his analogy of the
two suns to emphasize the significance of separating political
and religious power, and evinces the dual end of humanity.12

10

Hollander, “Purgatorio XVI,” 168
Purg. XVI.109-11
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John S. Carroll, “Prisoners of Hope (Purgatorio),” Expositions of
Dante’s Divinia Commedia. Ed. Robert Hollander with Andrew
Shifflett. (London, Hodder and Soughton, 1904): 106-114,
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While Dante ardently supports the separation of
Church and State powers, he neglects systematic explanation
of just what their proper alignment looks like in the Commedia. Instead, he reinforces and clarifies his arguments from
Commedia in Book III of De Monarchia. Published sometime
between his exile in 1302 and his death in 1321, De Monarchia
divides the foundations of Dantean political theory in three
categories: 1) the need for monarchy (Book I); 2) the ideal
monarchy (Book II); and 3) the origins of monarchial authority
(Book III). 13 Monarchia III refutes what Dante believes are
nine prominent misinterpretations of the relationship between
ecclesiastical and political powers, with arguments employing
Biblical, anagogical, historical, and logical evidence. In these,
he underscores three fundamental principles about the structural relationship between political and religious authority: 1)
there is no existential interdependence between the two entities; 2) there is no structural hierarchy between religious and
political authorities in the world (III.5,6,11); and 3), the distinct, individualized powers of Pope and Emperor must be recognized and protected for their proper function. Dante particularly emphasizes dismantling ideas of Papal supremacy over
the Emperor; that being said, he does not neglect scenarios of
imperial supremacy over the Church or improper unifications
of the two authorities. 14 However, Dante scholar Claire E.
Honess holds that Monarchia is also “a utopian meditation on
what might have been, and a reflection on what – between
1310 and 1313 – had gone so badly wrong.”15 Read like this,

13
Craig Kallendorf. “Virgil, Dante, and Empire in Italian Thought,
1300-1500,” Vergilius 34 (1988): 49, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41592351.
14
Honess, “Divided City,” 130.
15
Claire E. Honess. “Divided City, Slavish Italy, Universal Empire.” In Vertical Readings in Dante’s Comedy: Vol. 1. Ed. George
Corbett and Heather Webb. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers
(2015): 141, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt17w8gx0.13.
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Monarchia III is not just a philosophical proof for distinguishing between religious and political authority but a systematic
critique of the misconceptions corrupting political and religious authorities in medieval Europe (and particularly the
Holy Roman Empire). This makes it a valuable key for unlocking the precise points which Dante intends to make in his
analogies commentating on the relationship between Church
and State in Commedia.
Dante founds his structural separation of political and
religious authorities in the argument that both exist independently from the authority of the other. He introduces this
concept in Monarchia III.4, “the argument from the sun and
the moon,” where he explains that just as the moon does not
receive all of its essence, strength, and function from the sun,
but possesses movement and light of itself, so the empire does
not derive its absolute existence, authority, or function from
the Church. 16 (Here one must remember that Dante did not
have access to the principles of astrophysics that inform the
modern understanding of the gravitational pull and light properties that propel and illuminate the moon.) Rather, ecclesiastical and political authorities can borrow from the “light” of
the other “to fulfill their functions better and more potently.”17
While it may seem as if the “sun and moon” waters down
Dante’s “two suns” into two entities with a clear hierarchy, his
“argument from the election and deposition of Saul by Samuel” just two sections later in Monarchia (Monarchia III.6) reaffirms the structure outlined in “two suns.” Monarchia III.6
introduces Dante’s main premise for the independent existence of political and religious authority. Taken at face-value
the example is straightforward: when Samuel dethroned Saul,
it was not as a temporal religious figurehead (a vicar), but as a
distinct envoy for God. As such, Samuel cannot be used as
16

Alighieri, Dante. De Monarchia, trans. Aurelia Henry (Boston
and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company; The Riverside
Press, Sept. 1904), III.4.9; III.3.11.
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proof for Papal supremacy because he was not a Pope or anything resembling a Pope.18 But the greater philosophical significance of the example introduces a fact absolutely essential
to the Dantean argument for separation of Church and State
(and one later stated explicitly in Monarchia III.13)—namely,
that neither religious nor political authorities can transfer
power to an office that is not their own.
Most instances broaching the incommunicable nature
of political and religious authorities in Commedia involve
Dante criticizing the Church for attempting to seize or justify
using power that it does not rightfully possess. The Donation
of Constantine—purportedly a fourth-century document transferring Roman imperial authority from Constantine the Great
to the Pope (proven to be a later forgery in the fifteenth century)—is a textbook example. In his article analyzing Dantean
imperialism, Cary J. Nederman cites the approach to the Donation of Constantine in both Monarchia and Commedia as a
key indication of Dante’s understanding of the separate origins—and thus, independent foundations—of political and religious authority. Dante invalidates the use of the Donation of
Constantine as an authoritative proof of Papal supremacy over
the empire because it “assumes two precepts that are impossible”: that Constantine could to surrender or transfer imperial
authority, and that the Church could have accepted that
power.19 Nederman cites the illegitimacy of the Donation of
Constantine as evidence that imperial power remained “fully
intact as . . . both territory and jurisdiction” in the seat it originally held in Rome, and later in Constantinople.20 In turn, he
uses this non-transferability to explain that Church authority
does not depend on the Emperor, since the only way to establish this interrelationship would be to transgress the rights of
18

Ibid., III.6.2
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either imperial or ecclesiastical authority, and—as Dante
says—“the usurping of a right does not establish a right.”21
While Nederman does not define clear boundaries for the
rights of imperial and ecclesiastical powers, Dante at least offers detailed proof for the claim that temporal power is inherently oppositional to the nature (and therefore right) of ecclesiastical power in Monarchia III. 22 Ultimately, then, it is
illogical to assume that the existence and legitimacy of one
religious or political power relies on the other since the offices
of Pope and Emperor have entirely distinct natures that deprive them of the ability to transfer authority between one another.
Despite insisting that political and religious authorities are inherently different, Dante maintains that Church and
State are structural equals because their inherent incomparability makes each is supreme in its own domain. The same distinction of natures that prevents the transmission of power between religious and political authorities also prevents a direct
comparison of the two. Dante argues that a universal standard
of measurement can only be used to compare things of the
same genus, and while the Pope and Emperor are in the same
genus of being (because they are both men, and therefore possess the same substance), they have different genii of accident
(defined, at least in part, by their relationality). Simply put, the
Pope is Pope because of his relationship to the Church as a
spiritual father, and the Emperor is Emperor because of his relationship to the State as governor. The two powers are thus
defined by different accidental forms, which means that the

21
22

Ibid., 9
Monarchia III.15.1-4
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offices23 cannot be compared to one standard.24 Given this argument, there cannot be a structural hierarchy between Pope
and Emperor because that requires one office to fall closer to
a unified standard of measurement. Instead, Dante equates the
structural significance of religious and political authorities using the universal power of St. Peter “to bind and loose” all
things which pertain to his office—and his office alone—as
evidence for their supremacy within their respective domains.25
At the same time, Dante establishes a clear teleological hierarchy between political and religious authorities that
ultimately supports their structural equality. The emphasis on
achieving the spiritual fulfillment which culminates in the Beatific Vision throughout Commedia gives the Church a greater
teleological significance, since it relates to spiritual pursuits
more directly. However, Dante maintains the Aristotelian philosophy that earthly fulfillment is a necessary precursor to
eternal fulfillment—and thus the state also plays a crucial role
in salvation.26 Kallendorf writes that, to Dante, “politics is important . . . as an arena in which the Platonic hero can develop
the civic virtues as a prelude to the contemplative pursuit of
the summum bonum.”27 The Platonic hero may be markedly
distinct from the Aristotelian hero, but both Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies establish virtue-based systems in which
human fulfillment depends on achieving particular civic and
personal virtues. Aristotelian philosophy, however, bears

23

Dante is careful to distinguish that the incomparability of the offices does not preclude comparison of the men, insofar as they are
men and not Pope or Emperor (Mon III.15). This allows for a moral
comparison of both figures while still respecting their individual
offices.
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greater similarity to the Dantean understanding that the fulfillment of the end of the state develops the virtues that are conducive to eternal fulfillment. The ends of ecclesiastical and political society are comparable in this sense, though not in
structure, because of the type of relationality the comparison
considers. Rather than comparing their temporal powers relative to one another, the teleological ranking of church and state
powers compares their relationship to salvation, and so is a
comparison by the same accident. In the language of the “two
suns,” they are two lanes on the same road. Therefore, Dante
can and does distinguish between the structural and teleological relationships of ecclesiastical and political authorities to
establish a teleological hierarchy even despite their structural
equality and incomparability. In doing so, he builds a framework for understanding how the independent existences and
structural differentiation of religious and political authorities
relate to their teleological fulfillment.
Dante adapts Aristotelian philosophies about the telos
of the state and rejects the Augustinian condemnation of
earthly government to demonstrate the teleological significance of separating religious and political offices. While St.
Augustine maintained that earthly politics held no salvific
merit other than to reduce earthly chaos, Aristotle believed that
the state is an essential leg in the journey to human fulfillment.28 Dante’s notion of the teleological relationship between
the structure, function, and end of state derives from Aristotelian thought. In his Politics, Aristotle explains that a good state
is directed toward the ultimate human good—or happiness—
which he believes to be found in the acquisition of the virtues
that are necessary to fulfill human nature.29 Given his observation that “man is, by nature, a political animal,” and can only
find happiness in society, he contends that human fulfillment

28
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can only be achieved through participation in the state.30 Aristotle thus assigns a massive teleological significance to the
state, since a society that fails to promote the pursuit of happiness ultimately cripples the ability of its citizens to ever
achieve fulfillment. Since Aristotle means the fulfillment of
human nature when he says happiness, and the Christian concept of human fulfillment is the perfection of his nature
through the return to a state of perfect communion with God,
Dante’s ideal Christian-Aristotelian state culminates in the fulfillment of the Beatific vision.31
Here it is relevant to note that Aristotle and Dante do
not write of the same virtues: superficially, it seems that Aristotle emphasizes political virtues—virtues that moderate human temperaments and relationships—instead of the theological and cardinal virtues upon which Dante focuses. Neither
approach displaces the other, however; instead, Dante extends
the Aristotelian concept of civic virtue. Dante argues that
achieving earthly happiness through civic virtue facilitates the
higher-level contemplation that allows the pursuit of eternal
happiness.32 This notion is not foreign to Christian thought; in
fact, most Christian eschatologies include some reference of
political organization in the resurrected world. Consider, for
example, the language of the “New Jerusalem” in Revelation
21:22 (NRSV).33 That Dante thus expands and adapts Aristotelian political teleology to relate the end of the state (earthly
happiness) to the end of the Church (eternal happiness) has a
tangible historical basis.
The prominence of Aristotelian political teleology in
Dante’s writing helps illuminate his emphasis on separating
religious and political authorities in the world. In particular,
30
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the salvific significance that Dante assigns the state means that
over-subjecting political to ecclesiastical authorities would
cripple human fulfillment—a stance which is not unexpected
given the historical context and his personal experiences with
the Papacy. Despite its role in salvation, Dante still discusses
the state in primarily secular terms by arguing that the duty of
the Emperor is to guide humans to earthly happiness “by
means of philosophical instruction”—in other words, to develop the rationality and intellect that humanity needs to contemplate higher things. The influence of the emperor is not
limited to the temporal sphere, however; rather, the emperor
fulfills his role in the economy of eternal salvation by cultivating the natural virtues and temporal goods that facilitate spiritual completion. This purpose is markedly different from that
of religious authorities, who must “lead the human race to life
eternal by means of revelation.”34 Religious authorities skip
over the temporal realm and jump straight to the “big picture”
issue of eternity. As Marco insinuates in the analogy of the two
suns with the statement “the one snuffed out the other,” the
combination of political and religious authorities undermines
the pursuit of earthly happiness (and therein the achievement
of eternal happiness) by overemphasizing either revelation or
philosophy to the detriment of the other.35 Logically, then, political and religious authorities cannot be institutionally combined, since it undermines their capacity to recognize the individual role each plays facilitating human fulfillment.
Given his understanding of the relationship between
political and religious powers and the pursuit of earthly and
eternal virtue, then, it is entirely logical when, in Purgatorio
XVI, Dante attributes the marked absence of virtue in medieval Europe to an unnatural overlap between the Papacy and
Emperor. The analogy of the two suns, read in context of the
Aristotelian foundation of Dante’s politics and the incomparability of religious and political authority, depicts two entities
34
35
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of equal stature which possess their own sources of authority,
significance, and impact. Likewise, the analogy of the cleft
hooves emphasizes the need for the need for these two entities
to be separate to create a balanced society, and its allusion to
ritualistic purity in Leviticus insinuates that the two entities
draw a society towards God when separated and away from
Him when unified (since the uncleft hooves are defined as ritualistically impure). Ultimately, Dante’s understanding of the
Divine allocation of spiritual and political powers, and their
resultant relationship, suggests that denying their individualized functions, independent existences, or structural and teleological differentiation undermines salvation by denying the
Pope and Emperor the chance to fulfill their respective salvific
roles. Since the achievement of perfect human fulfillment is
the overarching theme and ultimate goal in Commedia and at
the basis of Monarchia, it is only natural that he is a scathing
critic of the combination of ecclesiastical and political powers.
In a nation where “Papacy” (the Church) and “Empire” (in this
case, in the form of a Democratic Republic) are mostly—if not
completely—structurally distinct, some may wonder how
Dante’s political theory applies to present-day America. The
power struggle between organized religion and organized politics seems outdated—but is it? Over the last eighteen months,
it seems that the dearth of earthly virtues and goodness far outweighs their presence in our country; and, just as Dante
blamed the organizing forces of his society, so today members
of the media and public institutions, citizens, and even politicians tend to blame the government for what they perceive to
be its failure to regulate society effectively. The Black Lives
Matter protests of June-July 2020, for example, were underscored with the belief that lack of reform in the American Justice System perpetuates racism; they were a public cry for governmental change to rectify a perceived social ill. Only months
before, the controversial drone strike on Iranian General Soleimani (3 January 2020) sparked an eruption of media outcry
and partisan debate that accentuated political division between
liberal and conservative groups, once again provoking public
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demands for political reform. In the ongoing wake of the
COVID-19 pandemic today, the public continues to petition
the government to provide equal access to sufficient
healthcare. Each of these examples highlights an instance in
which the general public tends to place responsibility for social issues upon the government. The government may influence the issue but, as Dante has shown, the answer is not so
simple as “the government is not doing its job.” In fact, his
examination of how a dysfunctional relationship between
Church and State affects human telos is remarkably applicable
to present-day issues.
In many ways, the modern American dialogue surrounding the extent to which the government ought to legislate
or be held responsible for moral issues adapts Dante’s examination of the ideal balance between a singular Church and
State power to a multi-faith, democratic nation. To understand
this application, it is beneficial to contextualize the meaning
of “moral” in this argument. In his stark structural distinction
of religious and political authorities, Dante also distinguishes
religious and political morals.36 Broadly, political morals pertain to the fulfillment of the end of a state; whether something
is politically moral in America is thus defined by the extent to
which it contributes to or obstructs an individual’s Constitutional rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Religious morals relate to the ideas, virtues, ways of life, and
guidelines for action that align with a particular belief system;
this is what is more commonly associated with the term ‘morality.’ Dante would say that the morality that relates to the
36
On first glance, some might mistake this as a belief hauntingly
similar to the Augustinian “city of man” and “city of God” scenario, where each is mutually exclusive. St. Augustine’s political
theory is largely based on teleological end, however, and so
Dante’s structural distinction does not fall into the same category.
The teleological hierarchy of Church and State that he outlines
means that this moral distinction works in favor of a harmonious
effort between the two authorities, not their disjunction.
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social issues for which the government is often blamed is dual:
it is a matter of political and religious morals. The cause, he
might suggest, is in their imbalance.
The modern picture admittedly looks a little bit different than Dante’s did. Where he was concerned with the overreligionization of political power, we face increasing secularization as politics bleed into the churches. Gone is the idea that
religion is the moral compass and government the legally organizing principle of society. Morality today—when one dares
speak of it as a set of established norms instead of an exclusively subjective lifestyle—is more determined by who you
voted for and whether your blood runs red or blue than by your
core beliefs and individual temperaments and actions. In other
words, it increasingly undermines religious morality by overemphasizing political “morality” (which has also been perverted by partisanship; but that is a paper for another time).
Politics, political morality, and religious morality are becoming so tightly interwound in the attempt to legislate social
questions into nonissues by creating laws that theoretically
rectify big-questions issues that we are beginning to lose track
of where one ends and the other begins. This is not to say that
politics should not be religiously moral, or that non-political
morals cannot be extended to politics. Politics should adhere
to certain principles from religious (and other domains of) morality, and so in that sense there is room for healthy overlap
between the two. When politics become a means of legislating
religious morals instead of political morals, however, or religious morals a means of manipulating political powers, conflict arises as the two “suns” battle for a position in which one
can “snuff out” the other.
As Dante demonstrates in his examination of the relationship between the fourteenth century Papacy and Empire,
striking a healthy balance between politics, religion, and the
enforcement of their respective morals is much more akin to
walking a tightrope than a well-paved road. Government,
Dante says, regulates earthly society, but the morals inherent
to this regulation technically fall within the domain of the
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church, too.37 The duty of the church is to cultivate the proper
virtues and dispositions that are necessary to rectify social issues, through emphasis on spiritual and interior life. Largescale social issues cannot be fixed in a generalized government/political action or legislation alone; they have to be addressed in the everyday lives of individuals, who one-by-one
make conscious decisions to live according the principles
which are hoped to be implemented. While it is the duty of the
government to regulate society broadly so as to best facilitate
the development of these attitudes, it is not its duty to actually
cultivate these habits of life and mind. Government is not a
governor of the individual, but a coordinator of said individuals. The government can legislate morals, but only to an extent, and with a largely disciplinarian approach. It is much
more effective if morals are taught, adopted, and incorporated
into the daily interior lives of the individuals whom the government governs. Given the individualized nature of this process, and the fact the government is not designed to cater to
the individual, this is not a job for politics. Rather, the church
should develop/nurture the moral disposition of a person such
that they promote healthy ideals in society. The church is thus
responsible for cultivating good morals and virtues which can
then be translated into government (all of this in a representative system in which the government directly or semi-directly
represents the will and disposition of its citizens). In this way,
religious morals are not trampled beneath politics, but inform
political action such that it is more effective; the “two suns”
work together.
Nearly seven hundred years after Dante wrote Commedia, we, too, are left striving to stumble across the tightrope
that is a healthy balance between political and religious morality and authority. Just as a tightrope sways and gives under
37

Here forward, church refers more to organized religion as a category than one particular denominational iteration of a specific religion to account for the religious pluralism of modern America.
Thus, the lowercase ‘c.’
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weight and movement, so the ideal balance of church and state
ebbs and flows with the evolution of a political society. Our
ideal arrangement of political and religious authority may not
perfectly mirror that of Dante’s time, but that does not discount the significance of striking a balance that does work.
Trying to address the prominent social issues of our time without considering the proper alignment of their religiously and
politically moral components is like trying to walk that tightrope with vertigo: perhaps not impossible, but certainly more
difficult. Address the cause of vertigo (an improper balance of
political and religious morality in the political approach to social issues) and begin treating it (through gradual changes in
the approach to and implementation of political and religious
morals), and walking the tightrope suddenly becomes less tenuous. Dante is not one to sugarcoat his warnings, and while his
wording may be elegant, his message to readers across the
ages is clear: walk the right walk or fall.
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A PYSCHE OF TRAUMA, ITS GENESIS AND
PERPETUATION IN MODERNPOSTMODERN SPACE

Devin Kaiming Zhang
Any attempt to locate the whereabouts of it ends up
like a dive into the foggy heart of an industrial city. Trying to
grasp it by gazing at it? Futile attempt as it is, it does reward
you with a picture: a picture of you, of what’s surrounding
you, of what is not what you have in mind, that is the thing
you are gazing at. It does not resist the effort of integration
through comprehension, for how could one configure the being of an absence? Yet by its absence it gives you a distinct
presence. The duplication of the surroundings is like a second
degree simulation. You can navigate yourself simply by looking at the mirror image of yourself. No, I am not talking about
postmodernism yet, I am talking about a commercial plaza/office building in my hometown. It’s clad in a mirror whose sole
purpose is to resist penetration, and to return the projectile
gazes back to their owners. On one part of the building its reflective armor is shaped like waves, so as to achieve the cunning artistry of seduction—it shows itself by a disruption on
its surface, to make you feel the presence of something on a
completely flat surface, yet in such discovery of an artificial
presence, the surface of absence that gave birth to it became
obsolete to the one who beholds.
The resistance of penetration becomes contradictory
when its porousness is revealed— the building has gates all
around it. Entering it is waving-goodbye to the world outside,
as I can still remember the moment I enter when it first opened
and the unique smell in the mall unlike any other places I’ve
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ever been to—a biome of its own making—yet not so different
from a hundred shopping plazas I’ve been to, as a stepping into
a structure like this is the reincarnation into a mechanical, fully
automated womb of glass dome. The escalator that goes from
the first floor directly to the fifth floor never stopped, and I can
still feel myself becoming dizzy when, being the only fool on
that escalator, I turned around and looked at the four floors
beneath me. I became dizzy, and myself on the first floor
waved at me, and I waved back from the fifth floor, with no
way of going down since the escalator only goes up. I was then
pushed along by the crowd that patrols around the floor like
sentinel bots whose sole purpose is to interact with products
neatly arranged throughout the floor. I felt like a platter of sushi on a conveyor belt, where the products in my eyes became
the consumer and I became a product. This is the topic of this
paper, on malls, or to be more exact, on the postmodernity in
which a shopping mall becomes an epitome of its character. I
seek to identify some phenomenal similarities between the
postmodern philosophical trend, postmodern space, and
trauma theory. I acknowledge my proposed method of inquiry
could make me a target of accusation, for how could I expect
anything plausible coming from my analysis without announcing with confidence of my expertise and theoretical exertion,
like an analyst to a patient, that these are your symptoms and
here is your pill? Therefore let us reach a consensus before we
proceed, that the goal of this paper is to send out an invitation,
an invitation to think not hierarchically but horizontally, not
foundationally but contextually, about the connection between
trauma not as a disease inscribed in MDS-5 but as a discourse
among common populace and what we now (often vulgarly
and abusively) refer to as “postmodern.”
A dissection of the paper into three parts becomes
helpful when making sense of the issue at hand: a brief account
of the affinities between trauma as a theoretical discourse and
the philosophical shift from traditional metaphysics-focused
tradition to the turn-of-the-language inspired trend. Following
is a short survey of the collapse of what is referred to by
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François Lyotard as “metanarrative.” Then a study of postmodern space will join the conclusions of the two sections before, at which the purpose of it will be to highlight how modern
space is traumatic in itself, whereas postmodern space exhibits characteristics of post-traumatic experiences. All three
sections serve well for the final dive into a comparative study
of two novels Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and The
Crying of Lot 49, where we shall see how connections between
the postmodern and trauma manifest themselves. The stylistic
choice of this paper will also be altered from the traditional
academic style, for to talk about trauma one must not illustrate
with mere arguments and quotations, but perform and emulate
the structure of trauma itself. The rejection of the academic
style and the adoption of the literary and the poetic is essentially the rejection of the metaphysical over the hermeneutics.
The subversion of modern metaphysics-centered philosophy is significant in the turn to language, in Saussure the
signified and signifier became separate, allowing one to reminiscence the claim of nominalism—the pipe no longer substantiates what it refers to, that there is a gap between the sign,
the symbolic, and the word “pipe” and the referent, the real,
and the longish thing we use to smoke. It is a tradition that is
post-Kantian in that the signifier and the signified resembles
the relation between the noumena and the object-in-itself. This
gap of meaning opens two possible routes to explore: the resistance of knowing and the collapse of a modernist narratorial
order.
The results of the tendency in recent philosophical
trend is especially notorious in the mutation of traditional philosophical work into the writing of theories, which is a process
this paper participates to a certain extent. What incurs its notoriety and its reputation is precisely the coherence with the
goal of “resistance to totality … to teleology … and to closure
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of any kind.”1 In France the mutation into post-structuralism
starts with seekers of escape from the all encompassing Hegelianism, or, if we are to be bold enough to imply, an escape
from what appears fatherly, a resistance of the Oedipus complex. The infamous claim of Derrida “there is nothing outside
of text” is almost trite due to its overuse. In a system of sign,
“words depend on other words for their meaning, rather than
on reference to some extra-linguistic reality.”2 Thus, even the
concept of transcendence is only sensible when it is configured
not as referring to anything outside the system of the sign but
an immanent transcendence. The criticism of postmodern deconstruction—that it rejects the existence of truth which leads
it to be self-defeating—is a misread, whereas the denial of
transcendence as such is not a rejection of it—not that there is
no transcendence, but what the transcendence is as such. And
this resistance dances vis-a-vis to the legacy of enlightenment,
the desire to know and to edify, and plays as an orchestra of
heterogeneity contra to the solo instrument of “the urge to
know … to convert otherness and difference into sameness,”
a coherent narrative that excludes anything heterogeneous.3
Henceforth this movement resists the analyst, the bigger end of an extending branch, and the first hundred sturdy
bricks you lay at the base when build a house, what comes is
“the ‘arborescent’ model of thought,” the stroll of a schizo, a
self-referential, contextual system that need no exteriority to
sustain the narratorial sensibility. It resists to be made sense
solely through the act of seeing and laying claims on reason,
since “vini, vidi, vici” , according to this frame of interpretation, is preceded by "vini, vidi, intellexi.” The act of seeing
accompanied by the act of understanding, of witnessing being
translated through a system of predetermined sign (signs that
1

Paul Sheehan, “Postmodernism and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), pp.21.
2
ibid, 23.
3

ibid, 22.
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bear the marks of substantiation) into the qualification of mastering, and of a history grasped through a consciousness that
interprets by a frame of narrative, as if history is like a grape
that can only grow if it climbs the rack of meaning, is the order
being subverted and criticized in the postmodern. Similarly,
the history of trauma seems to carry the same dynamic as the
tug-o-war of interpretation—the inexact origin of trauma and
the attempt of locating it and to territorialize it through either
psychoanalysis or modern psychological experiment resembles the dynamics between a system of sign as nothing but a
constellation of sign and the attempt to give them arbitrary
meanings, to make sense of what inherently no sense through
a creative process of naming—this longish thing is what we
call pipe, these symptoms you experienced results from the
physical shock you received in your spine when train crashed.
The inability for trauma patients to provide a sensible
account of where their symptoms originate from resembles a
history out of touch with the possible methods of account. The
basic philosophical inquiry “where am I from” finally becomes a strikingly demanding question when the event that
causes trauma passes. The person who survived the train crash
is left with a history that is not incorporated and a memory that
is not entirely hers but nonetheless haunts her. In Cathy
Caruth’s reading of the film Hiroshima mon amour, there is a
clear resistance to the attempt of making sense of by seeing.
When the woman mentions seeing the event of Hiroshima in a
museum, the man denies the aboutness of her experience,
which “suggests that the act of seeing, in the very establishing
of a bodily referent, erases, like an empty grammar, the reality
of an event.”4 The trauma erases itself when registered as history: “that happened to me a few decades ago/ I remember this
city has been through from reading my history textbook.”
What is known is solely the representation, whereas the origin
of the simulated representation is no more, yet at the same time
4

Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History
(Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), pp.29.
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exists as what cannot be grasped, something that haunts and
cannot be articulated, since every articulation disperses the essence of that trauma into the representational order of history.
This is why for Caruth, there is “the necessary betrayal of the
particular past in the understanding of a history,” since it is not
the trauma itself being commemorated, but it can only be commemorated as history through a system of sign that does not
belong to one's own.5
To elucidate, a real historical example will serve the
purpose well. On July 12, 2020, another earthquake happened
in my hometown. The magnitude is 5.1, the circle of impact is
about 10 kilometers. I try to collect information, including my
mother’s account, who was at the time at the site of the event.
I cannot feel anything, much like the time when I toured the
earthquake museum in my city that was dedicated to preserve
the memory of the earthquake in 1967, with the magnitude of
7.8, and 244,000 casualties. I watched the documentaries,
movies, and remains of that devastation. I comprehend, but I
do not feel anything, except a ripple of empathy. Empathy for
who? For the deceased? What is that which I witnessed? Is it
the original trauma? A simulation of it? Or is it simply another
story now I have to read? Was the museum tour any different
from Middlemarch? Is it more real simply because there are
collapsed pillars present? What if I donate some of my money
for a Middlemarch museum? My experience of the museum
tour resembles the experience of the woman in the film, which
makes the contrast between an order of knowing and the lost
origin stark. The moment of the earthquake is no more, and
the moment of Hiroshima is no more. The genesis is only now
preserved as a text that is open for seeing, but it is a representation of the genesis now that does not exist, a different type
of real, a hyperreal of the genesis. The true moment of the
trauma is not to be integrated into the consciousness, much
like the earthquake sites preserved throughout the city, unable
5

Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 30-31.
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to be made sense of by the generation born after the earthquake, nor can they be torn down and forgotten. The authenticity of traumatic commemoration is an event that is forever
lost due to the volatile essence of the event in relation to the
attempt to articulate and to make sense of. However this authenticity is at the same time perpetually present because of its
inability to be articulated and updated is forever present as
something that cannot be articulated, catheterized, or compromised—an absence. This is why Caruth claims that “a history
can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occurrence.”6
The resistance of seeing and knowing implies the need
of interpretation. Hermeneutics comes after the death of God
and resultant disruption of clarity of meaning. Perhaps the
death of God is not exact here. It is better to say the death of
God as such. To claim God is such and such can no longer be
registered as a metaphysical claim of God’s definitive
aboutness, but the essence of such claim recedes to a symbol,
an exclamation—doesn’t mean it is empty, but its aboutness
changes from a definitive claim about the ontology of what we
refer to as God to a claim that expresses one’s faith, of one’s
belief in the system of possible references one find possible to
choose from. It is not that I am “reducing” the claim “God is
dead'' to a direct denial of the claim “God exists.” It is more
like “the God that exists is not what denies other claims about
the ontology of God once and for all, but to say that God is
dead is, similarly, not to deny the claims about the ontology of
God configured as existence.” God as absolute has died, and
we now have to interpret and evaluate ourselves, just as the
traceable origin of the site of trauma which repeats itself becomes invisible. To hand the interpretation back to the consciousness self is what it does, so there is no excuse like “it is
true because it is outside of the system of interpretation and
signs as the absolute, as the objective,” but “it is true within
6

Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 19.
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the system of signs, because of relevant inferences within the
system that ultimately I have to interpret and decide.”
In short, it signals the collapse of “metanarratives,”
where, according to Lyotard, legitimacy of modernity turns
into knowledge that “refines our sensitivity to differences and
reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.”7 Attempts of assigning any happenings to a narratorial order resembles the attempt of making sense of trauma through articulation, either through making a witness possible, or by
submitting oneself to a psychoanalysis or psychiatrist. However, the state of traumatic experience where no witness is possible resembles this refusal to be categorized and archived by
language of others. To have one’s defensive shield breached
beyond one’s ability to integrate it, to make sense of it, and to
make past a paving stone of the present, is to lose one’s history, severed from the present. The barrier that is “a barrier of
sensation and knowledge that protects the organism by placing
stimulation within an ordered experience of time” lost its
power to order and to organize stimulations in traumatic experience.8 The triumphing optimism of modernism that is constantly in a fight to “break with tradition and to begin a new
way of living and thinking” turned into “a manner of forgetting or repressing the past … of repeating it, [not] overcoming
it.”9 The concrete “this is” and “thou shalt” turned into a process of recurring hermeneutics. Differentiating in styles of narrative from “working on time” in modernism to “working in
time” of the postmodern, narratives became less of an event

7

Jean-Francois Lyotard, “The Postmodern Condition,” in Literary Theory:
an Anthology, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Rya (Malden, Massachusetts:
Wiley Blackwell, 2017), pp. 510.
8
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 63.
9

Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018), pp. 1385-1388.
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but more of a position.10 Where modernist interpretation attempts to master the complexity of a narrative, postmodernism
sees the complexity and the proliferation of text as “a promise
or horizon to which art must try to live up.”11
Overall, the collapse of witness in traumatized individuals who can no longer be the witness of their own traumatic event means a repetition due to inability to integrate,
provided the witnessing from outside is not sufficient or does
not measure up to the authenticity. The loss of witness is contributed both by “the lack of responsiveness of bystanders …
[and] the very circumstance of being inside the event.”12 In the
meantime the postmodern condition in the collapse of traditional narratorial order implicates the need for references of an
immanent order, a “self-knowing, self-referential system of
discourse.”13 The parallel here is one between the death of a
witness and the death of the author, between an inability to
articulate, an origin lost, and the erasure of the importance of
the traditional authority that contains the meaning and the interpretative power of a text like a shop to their coupon.
***
An origin forever lost calls for a recurring confrontation with something strange and familiar, at same time “at
home” and “uncanny.” To be haunted by an image that is lost
is to give up the epistemological, since knowing is not to be
achieved here through laying claims on the real. It is a point of
no return, but perhaps the gap between the point of initiation

10

Steven Connor, “Postmodernism and Literature,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor (Cambridge, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 63.
11
ibid, 68-9.
12

Cathy Caruth, Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore, Maryland:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp.66.
13
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 82.
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and the post order can be made more comprehensible when it
is epochal?
It is said the rapidly changing production method and
the productive relation caused “all new-formed [methods and
relations] become antiquated before they can ossify,” that is
the case even if what a city feeds on is the ossification itself.14
Fossils turn into coals, and people dig them up, burn them, geological accumulation turned into capital accumulation, and
the enchanted earth now became the fertile soil for railroads
and factories. The city where I am from is known for its central
role in providing the nation with coal and steel before it is
known for the earthquake. One of the first railroads in China
was built here, and it became one of the first cities to modernize. The city commemorates its dirt and sweat well, as the
workers in coal mines and on railroads will sweat no more now
that they have been framed and put in museums, far away from
the city center where the monuments of the earthquake and
shopping malls lie. Sanitization now exists in museums that
preserve mining equipment as well, but after all they were still
ostracized. The German family that first came here and contributed a massive share to the development of the cement industry in the city now have their mansion turned into a museum, with bars and small restaurants surrounding it selling
German craft beer. The good middle class consumers now can
roam around the historical landmark while remaining a good
and safe distance from the real cement business, while drinking a craft beer gazing at the representation of the heavy, the
sweaty, and perhaps the dirty. What happened? Yet one thing
is for certain, that no matter what happens, it is a constitutional, quintessential change in the structure of representational and spectacular order.
Modernity, if not anything else, captures the motion
of accumulation perfectly. The surplus being used as investment for a new batch of productive capital, the growth of
14

Karl Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York,
New York: Norton, 1978), pp.476.
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profit, the rapidity of transportation, the growth of skyscrapers, the rising smoke of London smog of Victorian era, the
roaring 20s, the pop art, and the overwhelming amount of sensory input that exceeds one’s capacity to process are all part of
the modern scheme, the motifs that epitomizes the modernity,
the order of an utopian vision, the positivity that comes with
positivism. It is this same motion of accumulation that set the
definitive character of lyric poetry in Walter Benjamin, the
shock that would be the central productive and creative force
of poetry, and it would “sterilize this incident for poetic experience” when “it were incorporated directly in the registry of
conscious memory.”15 In a sense, the shock experienced by
lyric poets is to be the libido of poetry creation only when it is
not integrated into consciousness, only when it is represented
as mémoire involuntaire. The question, then, is what kind of
literature can be created through such a process?
The question is essentially a question of what shocked
the poet and how the poet shocked. For the first question I
would like to suggest these factors as exemplary samples of
study: 1. Public transportation in cities; 2. The mass in the city,
the moving crowd; 3. The factories, the industrial landscape
that characterized modernity; 4. The mode of repetition, for
example, standardization of production and reproduction of
artworks.
The action of parrying shocks assaulting one from all
directions is not a privileged activity reserved specially for
lyric poets. The case is for any city. For transportations, I got
hit by cars twice, fell on the pavement countless times, and ran
into someone a dozen times when riding an electric bike in my
hometown, an upgraded version of the good old modern invention that serves as a flaneur’s mount. I rode with little caution, for I know nothing will prevent me from being hit by
something today. Either a car will run into me because it
crossed a red light at the wrong moment or I will run into a car
15

Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Cape, 1970), pp.162.

71

Furman Humanities Review
because I am trying to bypass an area of traffic jam. I have my
headphones on all the time, not because I am trying to get myself in an accident, but because I can actually focus better with
headphones on, for I will be less paranoid from all the honking
coming from all around me.
The crowd goes well with public conveyance like bacon with eggs. It is characteristic of Benjamin’s observation,
which is that “[the] interpersonal relationships of people in big
cities are characterized by a markedly greater emphasis on the
use of the eyes than on that of the ears.”16 You don’t wish to
be blind in a city, for you will run into people all the time, or
perhaps fall into a manhole due to the poor urban planning.
You do not listen attentively for the sound of the bus that has
its wheels rubbing on the ground from a far distance, you look
out for the bus that is coming for you with the impatient driver
on his third shift. You cannot let your eyes off for one second
if you are navigating in a jungle of concrete. You will need
good eyes to make up for the ears obfuscated by the cars humming their engines around, by people talking, by music played
in stores, etc. This awkward position does not end with being
a pedestrian or a bike rider exposed outside. It is more marked
for people who are enclosed in public transportations like
trains and buses. Those make up a position where one has to
“stare at one another for minutes or even hours on end without
exchanging a word.” 17 In subways, buses, especially during
commute hours, one feels like a sardine in a can, or like a person trapped under a collapsed architecture under an earthquake. One is not only jostled by the elbows and feet of other
sardines, but the transportation itself is constantly jostling and
shaking, moving at an incredibly high speed that doesn’t allow
one to fully absorb what is happening to her experience, and
one can only operate on an instinctual note.

16
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Amongst the interwoven web of a massively complex
transportation system filled with numerous heads, one is subjected to a continuing flow of loss. To see a car pass by with
flashing speed, to see people getting on and off on a bus, to be
with others in a hermetically sealed place like subway or train,
only to bid them farewell the very next second, all contribute
to a sense of constant loss that is different from the traditional
“travel from this village to the other on a slow cart or carriage”
experience. The coincidence with trauma here is one of constant bereavement, where the visage, the locus of establishing
an ethical and personal relation, is always in a state of afterimage, because there is no capturing one’s image unless you dedicate yourself to a career of professional stalker. This bereavement is “a farewell forever which coincides in [Baudelaire’s]
poem with the moment of enchantment.”18 The “agitated veil”
of crowd through which Baudelaire sees Paris is common to
all city dwellers, which consists of imposed activities like being pushed around, or spotting a visage in a surging tide of
crowd, only to have it lost and replaced by a new face new
second. The experience in a modern city is therefore traumatic
in the sense that one experiences a physical dizziness from
transportation and a psychical dizziness, a recurring loss,
when being placed in a crowd that is constantly moving without its own telos.
“He becomes an appendage of the machine.”19 Is it a
passage referring to Chaplin’s movie Modern Times? Chronologically speaking, no. Formally speaking? Yes. The proletarian condition told by Marx has become the collective experience of the modern era. Like works when the industrial
revolution first ignited its engine, the subjugation to a machine
rhyme became more and more prevalent. For young and old
alike, “technology has subjected the human sensorium to a
18
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complex kind of training.”20 The mortar shells and the motor
engines are both the contraptions of industry that collared
around us and gave us a new sensation of time. A machine
time. We no longer move with our volition, the clash between
traditional craftsman model of industry hence forms a sheer
contrast with the mode of calculation in wage labour. Lyotard’s observation of technology is more than fitting: “[technologies] doesn’t respond to a demand coming from human
needs. On the contrary, human entities (individual or social)
seem always to be destabilized by the results of this development.”21 The human subject, henceforth is rendered incapable
of processing the stimuli, incapable of integrating the rapidly
revolutionizing experience and capital models, and a permanent sense of loss attributes to this sense of unintergrability.
Repetition is a central pattern for both modernism and
trauma. The assembly line renders the mass production possible through a series of adaptations to machine time, and technologies like photography and film allowed the affordable replication of artworks that were confined only to a specific group
of people before. In short, what we witness in the process of
reproduction of the artwork, according to Benjamin, is the loss
of the aura, the immediacy and authenticity of the artwork.
Moreover, just as in the traumatic repetition, where “the repetition of the traumatic experience in the flashback can itself be
retraumatizing,” the reproductive order of the artwork takes on
meaning on its own.22 “The work reproduced becomes the reproduction of a work designed for reproducibility,” just as the
repeated traumatic experience becomes trauma in itself.23 The
modern invention and reorganization of productive relations
20

Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, 175.

21

Jean-Francois Lyotard, “Defining the Postmodern”, 1387.

22
23

Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 65.

Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological
Reproducibility.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed.
Vincent B. Leitch (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
2018) pp. 981.

74

Devin Kaiming Zhang

provides repetition of traumatic experiences. Such is essentially the modern sensation experienced by Baudelaire: “the
disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock.”24 Reproduction of films, one of the most prominent modern art form,
marks the height of such transition from aura infused art into
the order of pure reproduction where the first paragraph of
Debord’s Society of Spectacle perfectly captures: “[everything] that was directly lived has moved away into a representation.”25 The shattered graphics in Debord’s Mémoires can be
read as a shocked psyche traversing in the highly modernized
cities. However, if we stop at the reading of Debord, we stop
at the height of modernity. Its continuation, however, is in
Baudrillard, and a movement from trauma eliciting modernity
to trauma-sustaining or trapped in trauma postmodern landscape is made possible.
The reading of postmodern landscape will be accompanied by two texts, Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close and
The Crying of Lot 49, with structural similarity about the protagonist traversing through a cityscape in search of a sign that
(arbitrarily) relates to one deceased.
What, then, are the two protagonists searching? Perhaps what is not the relevant question here, for it is, like all
signs, heavily laden with an unarticulated proposition, that
there is something that they are searching that is real. And by
real here, again, I do not mean real as the opposition of false,
but real as the “above” of a designated “false”. Therefore, the
question of Oskar—“if you don’t tell me anything how can I
ever be right”—is to be rephrased into “how could [he] ever
be wrong.”26 And Oedipa’s question “shall I project a world”
is no longer a question as her “projection” became highly simulated that the readers are forced to participate in her alleged
24
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paranoia.27 The reader has to linger from “is he/she mentally
abnormal” to a full involvement of the narrative of a finally
made-reasonable tale, which is perhaps the only possible
structural equilibrium one could possibly locate and achieve—
not in the text, but in the reader herself.
Since the inquiry about the “realness” of their
experience was delegitimized, the two novels share the same
textual performance in presenting a “‘flat’ network of areas of
inquiry,” in which “the respective frontiers of which are in
constant flux.”28 Different from a plot of a classical bildungsroman novel, I would argue, no real “growth” has been presented in both novels in regard to the psyche of the protagonists. For Oedipa, she is physically active, moving through
different spots and through different people in search of the
truth of the post horn symbol she perceives to have significance, but all her actions are predetermined. She does not
bring changes to anyone she had a conversation with, but her
role is not passive in the traditional sense. As for Oskar, all his
activeness are rewarded only with a fantasy, an untied knot—
the letters he sent, the play in which he is involved with, and
the final scene of digging up his father’s coffin. In short, their
stories “appear to have a progressive aim, but in reality they
have always ‘been achieved’.”29 Perhaps it is in this sense that
their actions are simulated, in the sense that all the narratives
about their stories weave into a coherent narrative within the
confinement of self-referential motion without ever going beyond that: “the will to change is simply all-pervasive. The
question is whether that change has a common goal (a modern
telos) or merely exists for change itself.”30
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This change for changes sake in the two novels coincide with the fantasy of Oedipa and Oskar, not fantasy in a
Freudian sense, where the fantasy for an object or a scenario
unravels the unconscious desire, but fantasy as the basic constituent of one’s selfhood. What the two novels did par excellence to other narratives that are about the other trauma narratives is that it achieves the goal of highlighting the repetition
of trauma through a gesture that points to the broken-down of
psychoanalytic authority. A disintegration of the organizing
force, of the epistemological imposition from hierarchy of a
set of cultural values is required to bring about the complete
collapse of any outsiderness. For Oedipa, singing this trope
with a higher pitch, we witnessed her psyche going to the
limit—“the act of metaphor then was a thrust at truth and a lie,
depending where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost”—and
topped with a return of a memoire involuntaire of her college
years, which is a frequent intrusion that was never fully explained.31 In her frenzy she bent down her proud self-legislating force, changing from her uncompromisable resoluteness
against the want of her subjugation to the authority, the lack
articulated by Dr. Hilarius at the beginning of the novel, to a
clear expression of a desire: “she wanted it all to be fantasy …
She wanted Hilarius to tell her she was some kind of a nut and
needed a rest.”32 A defeated schizo, in search of a legislative
force, went for a psychiatrist. This is where, normally in a bildungsroman novel, our heroine receives her transition towards
the other end of equilibrium, where she becomes a socially responsible woman capable of making the right decision. However, what we witnessed instead is a breakdown of the psychiatrist himself: Dr.Hilarius has gone mad due to paranoia. And
a curious turning point is when Dr.Hilarius confessed his past
and his subscribing to Freudian theory has a remedial mo-
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tive—because Freud is a Jew. It is reasonable to give the hypothesis that Dr.Hilarius is experiencing something similar to
survivors guilt, but what is more amusing is that here it is Oedipa who takes up the role of legislating and becomes the listener behind the leathered couch. She even advised Hilarius to
“[face] up to your social responsibilities [and accept] the reality principle.”33 Yet this is not a simple reversal of the role, not
a simple reversal of the master-slave dialectics, but an attempt
to break the limit appears when Oedipa confessed to Dr.Hilarius that she seeks the expertise of Dr.Hilarius as a Freudian to
dispel her search, what has constituted her character and meaning so far, as a mere fantasy. The reply she got from Hilarius
is to cherish her fantasies, for, he questioned “[what] else do
any of you have” and proceeds to dismiss the psychoanalytic
scheme that which constitutes his identity as a healer and Oedipa’s identity as a patient: “don’t let the Freudians coax it
away or the pharmacists poison it out of you … when you lose
it you go over by that much to the others. You begin to cease
to be.”34 A former fascist, Dr.Hilarius probably precedes the
first English translation of Anti-Oedipus by 11 years. He and
Oedipa thus sees the articulation of psychoanalysis that “if desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity
depends upon an ‘essence of lack’ that produces the fantasized
object” and denied its legitimacy.35 For them, fantasy is not a
representation of the lack of the real, but what one ought to
cherish, as it forms a flat surface, a contextually coherent system on one’s own account without any referential force towards outside—self sufficient.
The same goes for Oskar, when he resists the scheme
and questions the rule of the psychiatrist who tries to find
proof to prove him a PTSD victim. But what’s more important
33
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is the role of fantasy in the narrative of Oskar. It seems where
the ego of Oskar really resides is in his so-called fantasies.
First, his searching of the lock and the connection making and
clue searching is essentially a search for meaning in a meaningless landscape. Second, the novel essentially ends with a
fantasy where Oskar imagines his father will be safe. What is
genius about it is that it invites the readers to participate in
Oskar's fantasy, not as an authority that judges whether he is
in fantasy or not, but as part of Oskar, or as Oskar. The reversed flipping image of the person falling off the twin tower
ensures the endless repetition of it since by going backwards
one needs to go forwards first—especially for equipment like
cassettes. Oskar refuses to go through a mirror stage and identifies with what he sees. In his book that records things that
happened to me images of keys, Steven Hawking, turtles, geometric shapes, etc are present. How did this happen to him?
Perhaps it is only sensible to Oskar. Thirdly, the image in Oskar’s book of Hamlet holding the skull of Yorick is intriguing
because one may guess that Oskar is identifying with the skull,
but who could say for sure? In his school play, Oskar plays the
role of Yorick, the skull of a jester where Hamlet gazes and
interacts with as a passive object. Oskar’s part is no part at all,
he’s been erased from the play. His absence is simulated by
the all black costume and his papier-mâché skull, in order to
“give the illusion that you don’t have a body.”36 In fact, the
illusion given is not that Oskar doesn’t have a body, but simply
that there is no Oskar. The sweet coax of the teacher given,
that Oskar may steal the show if he plays anyone else, is shattered in the fantasy. In Oskar’s fantasy on stage, he becomes
no longer the passive skull who is being gazed at and is being
known by the active Hamlet and Horatio, but it takes on a force
of itself. No longer being subjugated and legislated by the gaze
of Hamlet, Oskar announces Hamlet’s fate by diagnosing him
with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, which is in fact the disease
36
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that has been tormenting Steven Hawking, whom Oskar admired. If this scene was a simple reversal of the role of the
subjugated dead skull and the living, active, neurotic, and Oedipal Hamlet, it would be less charming to read this scene over
and over again. What we witness is not a simple reversal in
Oskar’s reverie, nor simply a fantasy about revenging the
bully, but a making sense, an identification with his fantasy,
with his flat surface, which means an identification with his
repetition of trauma. When he smashed the skull which obscures him and denies his existence against the head of Jimmy,
the skull became the head of everyone he knows, the dead became everyone, implying the recognition of the ubiquitous
fear, of the feeling that “the hostage [,which is the victim] is
unnameable, anonymous, a kind of ghost who temporarily
haunts the imagination.”37 Is Oskar invoking universal annihilation? Is he repeating his trauma? We cannot conclude. But
what we can conclude is that by announcing “DAD doesn’t
make sense. MOM doesn’t make sense. THE AUDIENCE
doesn’t make sense,” and that the only thing that makes sense
in the fantasy of Oskar is “[his] smashing JIMMY SNYDER’s
face,” and that in this young boy’s fantasy he made sense, for
“THE AUDIENCE is applauding, all of them, because [he is]
making so much sense.”38 Like Oedipa, the refusal to cope
through the imposition of a narrative allows Oskar to not identify with fantasy, because calling something fantasy doesn’t
make sense when the object designated as the locus of fantasy
is denied. And as the reality fades, Oedipa and Oskar are able
to repeat their trauma endlessly without confronting an overriding narrative of “accepting reality.” It is a world-shaping
that makes one’s world into a Klein bottle, where all the difference between outsiderness and insideness vanishes, and one
is left with an endless repetition of an immanent nature. Such
is a trauma narrative without trauma.
37
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